borderline between the Jewish and Iraqi forces, in a place between Ijzim and Jenin. The Iraqi
officer sends a letter to the Jewish officer in which he talks on behalf of the local Arab
farmers who were shot by the Jewish army while trying to access their land. He notes that
Jews are now collecting the Arab crops and that such a deed has no “military spirit.” In order
to solve the problem he calls for a meeting, to which the two parties should come unarmed.37
This meeting indeed took place. Such local initiatives are perhaps indicators to the general
disorderly state of affairs.
However, the Iraqis did provide some assistance to the local Palestinian fighters. We know
from the IDFA records that there was a flow of arms and products between the “little triangle”
and the area occupied by the Iraqi forces, especially when the little triangle was under siege.38
Abu¯ Ashraf said that: “At night time we would go from Ijzim to ’A¯ ra [20 km south of Ijzim].
The Iraqi Army was stationed there. We would go and bring bullets on camels. At night. Past
the Jews. I also went a few times”. The documents show that the Jewish army knew of the
open route through the mountains:
An informer reports Ijzim’s fighters have good contacts with the village of ’A¯ ra and Umm az-Zi¯na¯t [a village
roughly 8 kms east of Ijzim]. ’A¯ ra is held by the Iraqis and they have a big force there. Iraqi soldiers visit Ijzim.
Last week Ijzim’s leaders visited ’A¯ ra and the Iraqi commander notified them that when the truce is over, there
will be a general attack on Haifa from the direction of Mishmar Ha’emeq by the regular forces, with air and sea
forces.39 He notified them not to allow Arabs into Haifa and to tell the Arabs of Haifa to keep away from it due
to the danger.40
The circumstances under which Palestinian villagers left their villages are at the heart of
public (as well as private) discussion. In the case of the Carmel district, although some
inhabitants were evacuated, the fighters were encouraged and even forced to stay. In at
-T
i
¯reh,
twenty kilometers north of Ijzim, many of the women and children were evacuated by the
Jordanian Legion in an organized manner. This protection of the family and especially the
women is linked to the central role of honor (sharaf ) in Arab society. A man’s honor is
dependent on the prevention of any harm, and especially sexual harm, inflicted on his women
kin. Therefore, the men felt it necessary to keep the women and girls away from any potential
damage, while they remained to fight. However, in retrospect, some villagers considered the
disintegration of families during the war a detrimental factor. In an interview in his Irbid
home Abu¯ Wasfi¯, at
-T
ireh’s mukhta¯r (headman) and a prominent figure in the district,
mentioned the evacuation of the women and children. His comment provoked a remark (or
was it an accusation?) from Abu¯ Majdi¯, who was sitting with us and was a child in at
-T
i
¯reh in
1948:A
I have one question to ask, Abu
¯ Wasfi¯: The reason that the women and children were sent away and the men
remained—what was the planned policy?. . .. Was it the politics of the forces from outside or from within?
Ya’ani¯, when my mother and my wife left, what was left for me to do?
This comment sparked a debate among the men in the room. The underlying assumption
was that the village was much more vulnerable when the circumstances of war did not permit
the preservation of the usual social order. Generally, the social fabric of the village was
portrayed as rural and traditional, where gender roles were clearly delineated (Abu¯ Ra¯shed
1993). The evacuation of the women and children in April 1948 entailed new domestic
arrangements—who would cook for the men? Who would do the laundry? Moreover, it was
not only the practicalities that posed difficulties; it was the image of the village as a
functioning unit that was shattered, even before it fell to Jewish hands.
The Iraqi army was a new factor intervening in the regular social order. That may
explain the villagers’ reluctance to allow the Iraqis to base themselves in the village or to
fight on their behalf. However, when the situation got graver (especially from the middle
of July), the Jizma¯wi¯s called on the Iraqis to join the fighting and yet this assistance failed
to arrive.H
EFRAT BEN-ZE’EV
20