HOLOCAUST ABUSE

The Case of Hajj Muhammad Amin al-Husayni Michael A. Sells

ABSTRACT

This essay reconsiders the category of "Holocaust denial" as the marked indicator of ethical transgression in Holocaust historiography within American civil religion. It maintains that the present category excludes and thereby enables other violations of responsible Holocaust historiography. To demonstrate the nature and gravity of such violations, the essay engages the widespread claim that Hajj Muhammad Amin al-Husayni, the former mufti of Jerusalem, was an instigator, promoter, or "driving spirit" of the Nazi genocide against Jews, and the associated suggestions of wider Arab and Muslim complicity. The essay uncovers the history of the Husayni narrative in question, the dramatic circumstances in which it emerged, its role in the 1961 trial of Adolf Eichmann, and its rediscovery and misuse within American popular and political circles over the past two decades. Such misuse, it concludes, corrodes Holocaust recognition within American civil religion and demonstrates the need for a revision of the socially accepted ethical boundary for responsible Holocaust historiography.

KEY WORDS: Holocaust, civil religion, memory, recognition, denial, historiography, genocide, antisemitism, nazification, judeophobia, islamophobia, Middle East

"Religious ethics" could refer to ethical discourses within religious traditions, between religious traditions, or about religious traditions, including traditions of civil religion. In recent years, American civil religion has come to embrace the memorialization of the Holocaust: the memory of the crime and, most importantly, the humanity and individuality of those who perished within it and of those many others who suffered and continue to suffer from its wounds. That memory has been enshrined within the federally sponsored United States Holocaust Memorial Museum that stands adjacent to the National Mall in Washington, D.C. The United States has incorporated Holocaust memory into its cultural life from university programs to popular films; and through resolutions of Congress and public statements by political and media personalities, it has put itself forward as an international guardian of Holocaust recognition.

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Among the abuses of the Holocaust, one in particular, Holocaust denial, has been given a name. More than a dozen countries in Europe have criminalized it, and many societies have viewed it as a serious moral breach. The historian Omer Bartov emphasizes the distinction between "the wholly objectionable politics of denial and the fully legitimate scholarly revision of previously accepted conventional interpretations of any historical event, including the Holocaust" (Bartov 2000, 12). He also lists historiographical criteria for making such a distinction: "that the historian place information in context, document claims and sources, acknowledge possible bias or agendas in sources, follow ethical standards in taking testimony from witnesses and survivors to avoid manipulation, and in all cases present with clarity the major narrative that is to be revised" (Bartov 2000, 12). In this essay, I examine an increasingly influential form of Holocaust revisionism that, although it is not a form of denial, transgresses the standards just noted and undermines the integrity of Holocaust recognition within American society. As a corrective, I propose the extension of the societal disavowal of Holocaust denial to other expressions of irresponsible Holocaust revisionism.¹

1. The "Grand Mufti" in Nazi Berlin

The case at issue concerns the wartime actions of Hajj Muhammad Amin al-Husayni, who rose with the backing of the British Mandate High Commission in Palestine to become the mufti of Jerusalem, leveraged that position to gain control over the waqf, the endowment for the Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem, and went on to become a leader of the Arab revolt against Britain in the late 1930s and head of both the Arab Higher Committee and the Supreme Islamic Council in Palestine. In 1937, Husayni fled to Lebanon to avoid arrest by British authorities, then moved on to Iraq, where he supported an Axis-leaning nationalist coup and propagandized against Jews. After the fall of the short-lived Iraqi revolutionary regime, he escaped to Iran, then Italy, and finally to Berlin. Adolf Hitler offered him an audience, during which Husayni proposed to rally Arabs and Muslims to the Axis cause in return for Axis support for his claim to leadership over the Arab world. Germany provided him with a lucrative stipend and an administrative office in Berlin, the Bureau of the "Grand Mufti" (Büro des Großmufti), and encouraged him to believe that the Third Reich would recognize him as the leader of Arabs and even of Muslims worldwide (De Luca 1979; Mattar 1988; Elpeleg 1993; Husayni 2001).

¹ The ethics of Holocaust historiography is of course only one element of Holocaust recognition within American civil religion. Among the large body of scholarly literature on American Holocaust memorialization, I have found Linenthal 2001 and Novick 1999 to be particularly helpful.

Husayni, for his part, spoke on radio programs broadcast to Arab nations, calling on his listeners to support the Axis in defeating common enemies: Britain, communists, and Zionists or Jews (two groups he conflated as often as not). He enlisted Arab students and prisoners of war in Germany into a special Wehrmacht military unit that fought under the motto "Free Arabia." He arranged parachute drops and sabotage missions against British targets in Syria, Iraq, and Palestine. He called on anti-Soviet Muslims from the Crimea and Caucasus regions to join the German war effort. And, in response to Britain's authorization of a special Jewish legion to fight with the Allies, he urged German support for an Arab pro-Axis legion (Husayni 1999, 113-23). He helped SS chief Heinrich Himmler form a Bosnian Muslim unit of the Waffen SS; and to that end he told Bosnian recruits that Nazism and Islam shared four key concepts (family, order, the leader, and faith); and that Germany had not colonized Muslim peoples, in contrast to Britain and Russia, which were also at that moment supporting the Serb royalists whose militias, known as Chetniks, were carrying out mass killings against the Muslim populations of southern and eastern Bosnia. He also protested against proposals to secure Axis permission for groups of Jewish children and adults to leave Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary for safety in Palestine—even though he would have been aware that they faced grave danger in Eastern Europe.²

The most incriminating document regarding Husayni's role in World War II may be one written by Husayni himself: his *Memoirs* (*Mudhakkirat*), which was first published in serial form in Arab periodicals in the 1960s and 1970s. Husayni wrote with a retrospective view of the ruinous consequences of Nazi rule, but nevertheless expressed his continued admiration of Himmler, who had hosted him once a year during the war and impressed him as a profound philosopher of history (Husayni 1999, 123–24), complained to him about the perfidy of Jews (Husayni 1999, 124–25), and, Husayni claims, shared secret information with him in 1943, including news of Germany's nuclear program and the number of European Jews (three million) that had perished since the outbreak of the war (Husayni 1999, 126–27).

The judeophobia of the *Memoirs* is robust.³ It includes scriptural phobia—the selective use of the Qur'an, hadith, and *sira*, as well as the

² See the copies of Husayni's letters of protest regarding immigration to Palestine during the war in Husayni 1999, 188–202; Husayni 2001, 166–69, 179–81, 215–16; see also Achcar 2010, 150–55.

³ Scholarship has acknowledged the many problems with the term antisemitism and its variants. The term, applied approvingly to their own ideology by late nineteenth-century European judeophobic writers, was from the start a misnomer. Most self-declared antisemites were concerned primarily or exclusively with Jews in Europe and had little interest in other peoples considered to be Semites. In the present context, the term has been used to separate modern racial judeophobia from other forms, to indicate an exterminationist or potentially exterminationist judeophobia as opposed to other forms of anti-Judaism, to

Bible and Talmudic literature, to portray Jews as enemies of God and humanity; the conspiratorial phobia that sees the hidden hand of Jewish power behind the world's ills; and the ritual phobia of the blood accusation—the calumny that Jews, in obedience to their religious obligations, kidnap and murder non-Christians and use their blood in Passover matzos and Purim pastries (Husayni 1999, 165–70, 410–19). Husayni also approvingly recalled Himmler's remark that during the deportations of Dutch Jews, only Jews responded to Nazi offers to pay for information on Jews in hiding; as well as Himmler's story that, upon inspecting a concentration camp, he had been shocked to observe that some Jewish prisoners were being abused and that the abusers were Jewish kapos, whereupon he immediately ordered that those guilty of the mistreatment be punished (Husayni 1999, 126, 413–14).

In addition to embracing these Nazi professions of moral outrage at the purportedly unchivalrous behavior of the people they were in the process of destroying, Husayni also recalled his visit to Alfred Rosenberg's Institute for the Study of Judaism, where he had been impressed by the institute's seventy full-time academic experts who, through historical, cultural, and religious research, were purportedly seeking to discover a method to civilize Jews in a peaceful manner. He adds that according to Rosenberg the experts had failed to discover such a method (Husayni 1999, 159–61).

The man who wrote *Memoirs* was embittered over the Arab defeats of 1948 and 1967 and his own marginalization within Palestinian and Arab politics. He was both defensive and defiant about his wartime support of and service to Nazi Germany. Even so, *Memoirs* demonstrates with verifiable detail that, at least from the time he settled in Berlin, he admired Himmler in particular and Nazism in general, shared or came to share Himmler's hatred and fear of Jews, and did everything in his power to promote the Axis cause among Arabs and Muslims. That his efforts produced little of military or geopolitical consequence was not due to any lack of zeal on his part.

Arabs in large

2. Newman

The narrative in question here, however, presents Husayni not simply as a supporter and agent of Nazi Germany, but as an instigator or "driving spirit" behind the Nazi extermination of European Jewry, a close friend of Adolf Eichmann, and an exacting inspector of death-camp operations.

distinguish Christian anti-Judaism from what the papal document "We Remember" referred to as the rebirth of paganism of which Nazi antisemitism was an expression (John Paul II 1998). The misnomer generates further confusion in controversies over "Arab anti-Semitism" given that Arabs are popularly viewed by themselves and others as Semites.

Many of its more recent iterations link Husayni's allegedly instrumental role in the Holocaust to claims about Arabs or Muslims more widely. Because the story of the development of this narrative has not been fully told and because the use to which it is being employed bears upon the core ethic of Holocaust historiography, I trace it here with as much precision as possible.

Its primary source was SS Colonel Dieter Wisliceny, who had been at different times Eichmann's superior, rival, and subordinate. Wisliceny played an important role in the deportation of Slovakian Jewry and headed the Special Command for Jewish Affairs in Greece in 1943, which organized the ghettoization of Jews in advance of their deportation to death camps at Auschwitz and Treblinka. He also became known for extracting funds from Jewish communities in exchange for his promises to end or slow the deportation process in Eastern Europe. After Germany's surrender he was arrested in Austria on suspicion of war crimes. He testified for the prosecution at Nuremberg, providing the major exposé of Eichmann's role in the Holocaust. He also produced extensive accounts before, during, and after his January 3, 1946 testimony before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, but, with the three exceptions discussed below, made no mention of Husayni playing an important role in the Nazi genocide.⁴

In early 1946, Israel Rudolf (Rezcö) Kastner and Andre Steiner—two Zionist activists who had dedicated themselves to rescuing Jews of wartime Hungary and Slovakia from deportations—submitted affidavits to Nuremberg war-crimes investigators. Kastner's affidavit (hereafter referred to as *K-W*, for Kastner-Wisliceny) stated that during World War II, Wisliceny told him that Eichmann had declared that, in deference to Husayni, German officials would not allow Jews to depart for Palestine, at least openly; a claim that aligns well with Husayni's well-established protests against any Jewish emigration toward Palestine. The affidavit then turned sensational. Wisliceny is quoted as having told Kastner that:

According to my opinion, the Grand Mufti, who has been in Berlin since 1941, played a role in the decision of the German Government to exterminate the European Jews, the importance of which must not be disregarded. He had repeatedly suggested to the various authorities with whom he has

⁴ For Wisliceny's affidavit submitted in connection with his testimony on direct examination before the International Criminal Tribunal in Nuremberg, see Office of the United States Chief of Counsel For Prosecution of Axis Criminality 1945–46, 606–19. For the transcript of that testimony, see International Military Tribunal 1947, 355–73. For the November 15, 1945, interrogation of Wisliceny, see Mendelsohn 1982, 130–41. For transcripts of the interrogations of Wisliceny on November 15, November 17, and November 23, 1946, along with analysis of the interrogations, see Overy 2001, 174–99 and 354–400. For the full English translation of Wisliceny's lengthy statement written in prison in Bratislava at the end of 1946, see Friedman 1961, 169.

been in contact, above all before Hitler, Ribbentrop and Himmler, the extermination of European Jewry. He considered this as a comfortable solution of the Palestine problem. In his messages broadcast from Berlin, he surpassed us in anti-Jewish attacks. He was one of Eichmann's best friends and has constantly incited him to accelerate the extermination measures. I heard say that, accompanied by Eichmann, he has visited incognito the gas chamber at Auschwitz.⁵

The Steiner-Wislicency affidavit (hereafter *S-W*) presents a nearly identical scenario. "The Mufti was a bitter arch-enemy of the Jews and had always been the protagonist of the idea of their annihilation," Steiner recalls Wisliceny telling him. According to Steiner, Wisliceny then stated: "The Mufti was also one of the initiators of the systematic extermination of European Jewry by the Germans and had been the permanent collaborator and adviser of Eichmann and Himmler in the execution of the plan." Wisliceny would later be shown the Steiner affidavit and would sign it, attesting that, with some minor exceptions, it accurately reflected what he had told Steiner during the war.

In addition to his passive acceptance of the reconstruction of these purported wartime conversations, Wisliceny would write a statement in July 1946 (hereafter referred to as *Map Room*), recounting a conversation he claimed to have had with Eichmann in January 1942. In the course of that conversation, Eichmann purportedly told Wisliceny that Husayni had visited him in his (Eichmann's) office suite in Berlin; that he had taken Husayni into his special *Kartenzimmer* (map room or card room); and proceeded to lay out for him the plans for the destruction of European Jewry. *K-W*, *S-W*, and *Map Room* were soon followed by Simon Wiesenthal's 1947 unsourced allegation that Husayni had inspected Auschwitz and Majdanek in the company of Eichmann, observed the crematoria operations, and singled out the hardest workers for praise (Wiesenthal 1947, 37; and for a later iteration of the claim, but without the mention of Majdanek, see Wiesenthal 1990, 180–81).

After the war, an early version of the accusations against Husayni, based on the Kastner and Wisliceny affidavits, featured in a March 1946

⁵ The Kastner Affidavit on Wisliceny (*K-W*) can be found in Hillel Silver Archives 1946. ⁶ Andre Steiner, affidavit on Wisliceny (*S-W*), 6 January 1946, Central Zionist Archives SW 25\10718. The discussion that follows will be sourced largely to documents preserved in four folders in the "Political Department" section of the Central Zionist Archives in Jerusalem, referred to hereafter as CZA. The code for the Political Department archives is SW\25. The four relevant folders are SW\3326, "The correspondence of Gideon Ruffer (Rafael) during the time of his travels in Europe" 1946; SW\3340, "The correspondence of Gideon Ruffer concerning war criminals (the Mufti and Wisliceny, Eichmann, etc.)" 1946; SW\3482, no description available, 1946–; and SW\10718, "The mission of Gideon Rafael to Europe: Nazi war criminals" 1945–1948. The letters and papers seldom include pagination and it is not feasible to give page numbers for the contents of the various folders.

article in *The Nation* by Eliahu Epstein (later Elath) (Epstein 1946). In 1947, the widely syndicated journalist Drew Pearson published a graphic version of the Husayni story, tied Husayni's alleged extermination program to Arabs and Muslims more generally, and used it to denounce the Arab position at postwar deliberations over Palestine (Pearson 1947, 1, 3). The same year, the Jewish Agency activist Maurice (Moshe) Pearlman published a much longer and more detailed version of the story with large parts of the two affidavits quoted verbatim. Pearlman's account appears in a chapter titled "Perish Judea" in his book Mufti of Jerusalem (Pearlman 1947, 66–74). "Perish-Judea" types of accounts were also sent by the Jewish Agency's Jerusalem office to the British foreign ministry and circulated within American Zionist circles led by Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver (Hillel Silver Archives 1946).8 A particularly vivid version featured in Behind the Silken Curtain by Bartley Crum, a supporter of the American Christian Palestine Committee and Truman appointee to the Anglo-American Joint Commission of Inquiry on Palestine (Crum 1947, 108–14).9 In what follows I use the term "Perish-Judea" to refer to portrayals of Husayni as originator, architect, or driving spirit of the Holocaust that are based on *K-W*, *S-W*, and *Map Room*.

The three sources for this narrative raise a number of questions.¹⁰ Kastner never explained or defended the allegations in *K-W*, and he ignored them completely within the dozens of other reports, affidavits, and testimonies he authored on his dealings with Eichmann, Wisliceny, and other Nazi officials—including a comprehensive three hundred page report he drafted on behalf of the Budapest rescue group and presented to the World Jewish Congress in 1946 (Kastner, Landau, and Schmid 1961; see also Barri 1997). Andre Steiner maintained a decades-long public silence on his

⁷ For the influence of the article by Epstein (Elath) on the American press, see Berman 1990, 213–14n41.

⁸ On the American Zionist Emergency Committee led by Silver and its deployment of the allegations against Husayni, see Berman 1990, 160–62. For the similar document sent to the British Undersecretary of State, see Jewish Agency to the British Undersecretary of State 1946, available in the British Archives. The Foreign Office folder includes handwritten comments of British officials regarding the allegations against Husayni.

⁹ In pressing the Perish-Judea story on Bartley Crum, Pier and his colleagues were aided by a wider circle of skilled lobbyists and writers in the United States, including Gerold Frank, who co-wrote Crum's book, and Emmanuel Neumann, who was influential in the Zionist public relations program in the United States (Merkley 1998, 172; Bosworth 1997, 157–206; Neumann 1976, 216–18; Weizmann to Crum, June 8, 1947, in Weizmann 1979, 342–43).

¹⁰ For the possible source of Wiesenthal's allegation, conversations between Kastner and Wiesenthal regarding Husayni, and Wiesenthal's reaction to the publication of Pearlman 1947, see Segev 2010, 86–88. Segev also writes that Wiesenthal was behind a false story in 1948 that Eichmann was living in Egypt and that he had written to a colleague stating that he and a friend had planted the story in order to "lump the Arabs together with a suitable ally" (Segev 2010, 112–13, 215–17; see also Stangneth 2014, 98–99).

experiences with the Bratislava rescue group and the interactions he had with Wisliceny or other Nazi officials. And although Husayni's opposition to Jewish emigration to Palestine during the war was well-known, none of those presenting Husayni as Holocaust architect offered any evidence at the time—and none has been brought forward since—that he objected to or interfered with proposals or active programs to bring Jews to safety into areas outside of the Middle East, such as Switzerland, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Japan, China, or the Western Hemisphere.

I have drawn on archival sources, primarily those of the Central Zionist Archive in Jerusalem, in putting together the following account of the conditions under which the Perish-Judea narrative was produced and disseminated. The lead role was played by Gideon Ruffer (Rafael), an operative with the Jewish Agency in Palestine, who would go on to become an Israeli ambassador to the United Kingdom and a director-general of the Israeli foreign office. Ruffer worked closely with Bedřich (Friedrich) Steiner, a former colleague of Andre Steiner within the wartime Bratislava Jewish rescue group, who had started a war-crimes documentation effort in Bratislava in the aftermath of Germany's defeat.

Those who worked with Ruffer and Bedřich Steiner on war-crimes documentation operations included the above-mentioned Moshe Pearlman, who would go on to become an Israeli military spokesman and chief of Israel's broadcasting service, and Eliahu Epstein (Elath), chief of the Jewish Agency's Arab Department and a future Israeli ambassador to the United States. Other major figures were Teddy Kollek, future head of the office of Israel's prime minister and later mayor of Jerusalem, and Arthur Pier (Asher Ben-Natan), future director-general of Israel's Ministry of Defense. In their war-crimes documentation activities, they also cooperated with Tuvia Friedman, a Polish Holocaust survivor who began his own documentation effort in Vienna, and, warily, with Simon Wiesenthal, who had set up a war-crimes documentation operation in Linz, Austria, and whom they viewed with suspicion as a supporter of their rivals, the Revisionist Zionists, founded by Vladimir Jabotinsky and led by future Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin. 11

On January 3, 1946, the day Wisliceny was testifying in Nuremberg before the International Criminal Tribunal, Rudolf Kastner was in Geneva, Ruffer's base of operations, writing *K-W* and having it notarized. *K-W* was sent to the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem, which sent it on in turn

¹¹ See Friedman 1961, 81–203; Brandt 1964/65; Barri 1997; Pearlman 1963, 9–23; Kollek 1978, 28–83; and Pick 1996, 95–121. Bedřich Steiner explained his postwar role as Bratislava war-crimes documenter and advisor to the Bratislava war-crimes court during testimony at the Eichmann trial (see Eichmann Trial 1961, Session 50, Parts 5–7). For the wartime Bratislava rescue group that included Andre Steiner and Bedřich Steiner, see Fatran and Greenwood 1994. For a firsthand account by a former member of the group, see Neumann 1956.

to the British Foreign Office, with requests that Britain consider warcrimes charges against Husayni. In early February, Ruffer traveled from Geneva to Bratislava and, in the words of Bedřich (Friedrich) Steiner, passed on a directive setting out the "tasks and aims" for the Bratislava war-crimes documentation operation.¹²

On February 6, Andre Steiner drew up S-W and had it signed by several Bratislava colleagues in the presence of a notary. He then sent it to Ruffer, who forwarded copies to Moshe Shertok (Sharett), director of the political department of the Jewish Agency. Ruffer, Pier, and the Jewish Agency's Jerusalem office were soon cabling scoops on the story and facsimiles of S-W and K-W to Jewish Agency offices in Europe and New York, to sympathetic journalists in Europe and North America, to European and American government agencies, and to Allied war court offices. "I beg to submit to you the following information concerning the activities of the Mufti of Jerusalem during his stay in Germany," wrote Pier to Bartley Crum as early as February 17. "From most reliable friends I received affidavits which contain information about the Mufti's connection with the notorious Eichmann, head of the Gestapo Jewish Department. The source of this information is Hauptsturmfuhrer SS. Dieter v. Wisliceni, deputy of Eichmann." (The reliable friends would likely have been Kastner and Andre Steiner.) Pier added that, according to Wisliceny, "the Mufti was the driving spirit behind the mass extermination of the Jews" and "had returned from a visit to Auschwitz Konzentratienslager very much impressed about the German efficiency to solve the Jewish problem."13

Wisliceny, however, had not yet signaled his agreement to these allegations by signing S-W. On March 5, Ruffer obtained permission from American authorities to carry out his own private interrogation of Wisliceny, in the course of which he obtained Wisliceny's signature on S-W. He then cabled Moshe Shertok, referring to Wisliceny as "Willy" and to Husayni as "Newman": "re steiner affidavit concerning newman sent recently by myself have interrogated at nurnberg source willy who fully endorsed affidavit signing german copy quote have read this affidavit its content correct unquote will forward original first opportunity stop" (emphasis mine). The next day, Ruffer reported to a colleague in London on his group's success in using the affidavit to influence Parliament. "You certainly remember the interpellation in parliament last week,

¹² Bedřich Steiner to Ruffer, 9 May 1946, CZA SW 25\10718.

¹³ A. Steiner, S-W affidavit in Slovakian, 6 January 1947, CZA SW 25\10718; A. Steiner to Ruffer, Report on S-W, 6 January 1946, CZA SW 25\3340; A. Steiner and V. Pivko, notarized version of S-W, 12 February 1946, CZA SW 25\10718; A. Steiner, V Pivko, notarized German translation of S-W, 12 February 1946, CZA SW 25\3340; Jewish Agency to United Kingdom Undersecretary of State, 26 February 1946, CZA SW\3482; Pier to Crum, 11 February 1946, CZA SW 25\3340.

where it was mentioned that evidence about the Mufti's role as instigator for the extermination of the Jews in Europe is available in Nuremberg," he wrote. "Well, the basis for this interpellation was the information which Wisliceny gave during the war to our friends in Bratislava and Budapest. I requested our friends to make out affidavits and considered it essential to get the contents of this affidavits [sic] confirmed by Wisliceny himself." Ruffer's team kept track of newspaper articles reflecting successful interpellations in both Parliament and the American Congress.¹⁴

Andre Steiner was in the dark on the latest developments. In April, Ruffer responded to an earlier memo from Steiner titled "Angelegenheit W. Newman" (the Wisliceny-Husayni matter), in which Steiner asked if it was true that someone had managed to carry out a personal interrogation of Wisliceny. "The man who had interrogated Wisliceny at Nuernberg was myself," Ruffer replied. "You can imagine it was a strange feeling to be confronted with the man who had helped to do so much evil." In the same letter, Ruffer broached five critical issues: the hunt for Eichmann, the circumstance of Wisliceny's signature on S-W, the impending transfer of Wisliceny from American custody in Nuremberg to Czechoslovakian custody, his impending war-crimes trial in Bratislava, and his personal condition:

I got from him [Wisliceny] very interesting information on the probable hiding place of Eichmann which we just now are checking up. Furthermore he signed the German translation of your affidavit [regarding Husayni] and confirmed that the contents are true with the exception that Eichmann was not born in Palestine. You understand how important this signature is for us.

Now I would like to know from you details about the Czecoslovakian [sic] extradition request and when he actually will be transferred to your country. It would be valuable, if W. would reaffirm the matter of Newman at his trial, but it is nowhere worthwhile to urge for it.

¹⁴ Wisliceny, signature and notation on S-W, 5 March 1946, CZA 25\3340; Ruffer, notes on his personal interrogation of Wisliceny, 5 March 1946, CZA 25\3340; Ruffer, cable to Shertok, 8 March 1946; Ruffer to "Tuvia," 9 March 1946, CZA 25\3340. Articles in Ruffer's CZA file showing successful interpellations include Reuter, "Inquiry about the Grand Mufti," 26 February 1946, CZA 25\3340 and United Press, "Mufti's Arrest as War Criminal Demanded," 27 February 1946, CZA 25\3340. Further demonstration of how the moniker "Newman" was used in reference to Husayni is found in an April 15–21, 1946 agenda update sent by Ruffer to Moshe Shertok, the tenth item of which reads as follows: "Receipt of affidavits (Kastner, Switzerland) and (Steiner, Bratislava) concerning Newman share in extermination planning. Confirmation of Steiner affidavit by Wisliceny (Nuernberg)," CZA 25\3326.

By the way W. was very pleased to hear that you all are well. He has lost his belly and looks rather shabby. I must say he is a highly intelligent criminal and certainly will fight for his life with much skill.¹⁵

The situation in Bratislava, where Bedřich Steiner's group had strong influence with the war-crimes court, an influence of which Wisliceny was certainly aware, puts into perspective Ruffer's comment on Wisliceny's cunning, intelligence, and determination to survive. The activists reporting to Ruffer had persuaded American and Czechoslovakian officials to grant them access to Wisliceny, whom they visited in prison repeatedly and from whom they coaxed numerous written and oral statements either directly or by passing on questions through the prosecution teams. Concerned that the Americans would release Wisliceny, they worked to have him moved from American to Czechoslovakian custody. Later, fearful that he would be executed in Czechoslovakia before he could provide them with information or testimony regarding Eichmann or Husayni, they appealed to the Americans to re-assume custody. It is likely that Wisliceny would have heard or been apprised that Rudolf Kastner was testifying on behalf of other Nazi officials, including Hans Becher and Hermann Krumey, who worked with Eichmann and were implicated in the Nazi extermination program, and who had escaped prosecution in large part as a result of Kastner's intervention. As a desperate and crafty criminal, Wisliceny would likely have gathered or attempted to infer what kinds of information the Zionist activists might find of interest.

Only ten weeks after Ruffer sent his letter to Bedřich Steiner, Wisliceny wrote out his four-page *Map Room* statement and handed it personally to Jewish Agency activists during another visit from them to his prison cell. The *Map Room* begins with Wisliceny relating that Husayni had visited Eichmann at Eichmann's office in late 1941 or early 1942.

By chance I was with Eichmann in Berlin a few days later, when he told me in detail about this visit. Eichmann lectured to the Grand Mufti in his Map Room [Kartenzimmer], where he had collected statistical accounts of the Jewish population of various European countries—he lectured in detail about the solution of the Jewish question in Europe. The Grand Mufti, according to him [Eichmann] was most impressed and said to Eichmann that he already asked Himmler and had in fact secured Himmler's consent on this point, that a representative of Eichmann should come to Jerusalem as his personal adviser when he, the Grand Mufti, would go back after the victory of the Axis Powers.

Wisliceny adds that Eichmann offered him the position of special adviser to Husayni but that he refused the offer. He then proceeds to present

¹⁵ A. Steiner to Ruffer, 20 February 1946, CZA SW\3340; Ruffer to A. Steiner, 10 March 1946, CZA SW\3340.

himself as a dedicated opponent to the killings of Jews whose effort to support mass emigration from Reich-controlled Europe was thwarted, ultimately, by Husayni.¹⁶

It would be anachronistic to hold the Jewish Agency activists led by Ruffer or the former Zionist rescue workers of Budapest and Bratislava to the standards of historiographical representation that should apply to later versions of the Newman story. These men were not acting as historians, but as activists working in a war-torn Europe and in the wake of a catastrophe that had not yet been conceptualized as the Holocaust. Ruffer and Pier teamed with other Jewish Agency operatives who had been dispatched to postwar Europe to coordinate illegal immigration (referred to on the European end as Briha and on the Palestinian end as Aliyah Bet), war-crimes documentation, and in some cases arms smuggling. They loathed Husayni as a Nazi collaborator and viewed his possible return to leadership in Palestine as a threat. They lamented the allied preoccupation with the emerging Cold War that was eclipsing interest in pursuing Nazi criminals. As experienced covert operatives with strong connections to American and European intelligence agencies, they were no doubt aware that Western and Soviet bloc governments as well as governments in the Middle East and Latin America were competing with one another to find and employ former Nazis and Nazi collaborators who could be useful in intelligence gathering, propaganda efforts, and chemical, biological, nuclear, and missile technology; however, they would not likely have known or imagined the full extent of the various programs to recruit war criminals, cleanse their records, and put them to work for their new sponsors (Reese 1990; Hunt 1991; Breitman 2004; Steinacher 2011). They saw that their only chance of having Husayni arrested and prosecuted lay in making a case that he had played a critical role in the conception, planning, organization, and execution of the extermination policy. They lacked a nation-state to give them a voice in the investigation and prosecution of war criminals, and had been frustrated in their attempt to convince war-crimes courts to appoint a Jewish advisor to bring more legal and prosecutorial attention to the Nazi judeocide. Finally, they were also in the midst of an intensive public relations effort on behalf of the establishment of a Jewish state in British Mandate Palestine and in opposition to Arab lobbyists like Samir Shammai, who argued that the destruction of European Jewry was committed by European powers, and that it was Europe that should make a place for the survivors or grant them a state on its territory, not the Palestinians (Berman 1990, 160–61; 213n35–36). For all of these reasons, they prioritized their war-crimes

¹⁶ "Map Room" statement of Wisliceny, Bratislava, 26 July 1946, SW CZA 25\3482. Compare Stangneth 2014, 43. In early 1948, Wisliceny was tried, convicted, and hanged for crimes he had committed under Nazi rule.

documentation efforts on the hunt for Eichmann, the manager of the extermination policy, and on the case against Husayni, even as they attempted to tie Husayni to Eichmann.¹⁷

3. Two Trials

With the UN vote to establish Israel, the Arab defeat of 1948, and the resulting marginalization of Husayni within Palestinian and Arab politics, the Newman story would fade from view for a time as attention shifted instead to one of Husayni's accusers, Israel Rudolf Kastner. Kastner had gone on to become a spokesman for Israel's Ministry of Commerce and Industry when, in 1952, his past turned against him. Malchiel Gruenwald, a member of the Revisionist Zionist movement, accused Kastner of betrayal. Instead of warning Hungarian Jews not to get on trains bound for what was supposed to be a work camp, Gruenwald charged that Kastner, who knew the trains were bound for Auschwitz and what would happen to the passengers on arrival, remained silent, even as he arranged with Nazi officials one actual rescue train (that came to be known as "The Kastner Train") for a chosen few Hungarian Jews, many of whom were from his hometown and some of whom were members of his own family.

The government of Israel responded by suing Gruenwald for libel against a state employee. At trial, however, Gruenwald's attorney Shmuel Tamir turned the tables, putting the plaintiffs—Kastner and the socialistlabor (Mapai)-led government—on the defensive. The trial unleashed Revisionist resentments against Mapai over a number of issues: the Haavara or transfer program of 1933-39 that brought Jews from Germany to Palestine in exchange for the purchase of German-produced goods; contending priorities and strategies regarding Jewish rescue during the war; and Jewish Agency opposition to the armed revolts waged by Revisionists against British rule in Palestine during and after the war. At the trial, Kastner found himself inarticulate in justifying his decisions during the war, and was caught lying when he denied having helped Eichmann's associate Kurt Becher escape war-crimes prosecution. The presiding judge dismissed most of the libel charges against Gruenwald and then, departing from his judicial role, issued the memorable metaphysical judgment that in his negotiations with Nazis, Kastner had "sold his soul to the devil" (Segev 1993, 282–83).

The government successfully appealed the verdict, and Kastner's reputation has since been rehabilitated. Defenders point out that he would not have been allowed by the Nazis to travel among Jewish communities in

¹⁷ This set of concerns was outlined as part of the twenty-point agenda summary sent by Ruffer to Moshe Shertok (Sharett), 21 April 1946, CZA 25\3326. Ruffer's published memoir does not, unfortunately, cover his pre-1948 career. See Rafael (Ruffer) 1981.

Hungary sounding the alarm about Auschwitz. Even if he had spread warnings by other means, Hungarian Jews were unarmed, hemmed in by Hungarian gendarmes, and had nowhere to flee. Kastner was not a traitor, they argue, but a rescuer who put his life at constant risk to save those he could. Such developments came too late for Kastner personally; he was assassinated in 1957.¹⁸

When Adolf Eichmann was captured and brought from Argentina to Israel in 1960, the government of David Ben-Gurion saw the chance to put a major perpetrator on trial before the people who had been victimized, and in whose name the state of Israel would claim the right and responsibility to sit in judgment, the controversy surrounding Israel's legal stature in the case notwithstanding. Germany and Austria showed little interest in trying Nazi criminals at that time and, in the event that Eichmann was extradited to either nation, there was the possibility he would be released or, if convicted, given a minimal sentence. Only when Israel put Eichmann on trial was Germany jolted, finally, into removing some of the more notorious Nazi criminals from government positions and prosecuting others who had been living openly under their own names over the past decade. The Eichmann trial also served to purge Israeli society of some of the lingering recriminations from the Kastner Affair and redirect Holocaust-related emotions to other areas, especially the Arab-Israeli dispute.

As the trial was in preparation, the American writer Quentin Reynolds produced a book on Eichmann that included a most colorful scene. "The Mufti accompanied Eichmann on his inspection tours of the concentration camps," wrote Reynolds. "His green turban was seen many times in Auschwitz, Treblinka, and Majdanek," he continued, thereby adding Treblinka to the camps inspected by Husayni. The detail-oriented Husayni asked Eichmann "how the crematoria worked, how the mass murders were executed, and also the capacity of the crematories," and Husayni's "appetite for transports" exceeded even that of Eichmann (Reynolds 1960, 173–76). Reynolds offered no evidence beyond the assurance that he had been shown "incontrovertible" documents by Avi Aldouby, a member of the team that captured Eichmann (Reynolds 1960, v–vi).

¹⁸ For the Kastner (or Kasztner) affair, see Segev 1993. For a Revisionist case against Kastner and the Mapai wing of Zionism, see Hecht 1961. For a more positive perspective on Kastner and other rescue workers in Eastern Europe, see Bauer 1994, 255–95; and Weitz 2011. For a personal recollection of the Kastner train, see Löb 2009. For the multiple and contradictory testimonies of Kastner regarding Wisliceny, Becher, and Krumey, see Barri 1997; and Weitz 2011, 15–74, 158–59, 222–24, 286–87. For fine-grained studies on the Jewish Agency and its policies toward rescue, see Porat 1990; on the wartime Aliya Bet efforts to rescue Jews to Palestine, Ofer 1990; and on the dilemmas and controversies facing Jewish rescue workers in Holland, Wasserstein 2014.

As prosecutors in Israel were preparing their case against Eichmann, the government drew analogies between the Arab foes of Israel and Nazi Germany (Yablonka 2004; Segev 1993, 323–66; Zertal 2005, 91–115). Foreign Minister Golda Meir insisted that the Husayni matter be brought into the trial in order to demonstrate a link between the Arab national movement and the judeocide directed by Eichmann (Yablonka 2004, 84–85). A similar link had already been intimated on a wall within the Yad Vashem Museum that opened to the public in 1957. Tom Segev described a wall within the museum "devoted to the connections that the Palestinian leader Haj Amin al-Husayni established with Nazi officials. The visitor is left to conclude that there is much in common between the Nazis' plan to destroy the Jews and Arabs' enmity to Israel" (Segev 1993, 425).

Once the trial was underway, the prosecution successfully moved to have Wisliceny's Map Room statement and S-W entered into the record, over repeated objections regarding the relevance and reliability of the claims those documents contained. 19 The S-W motion, which came during testimony by Bedřich Steiner, led to an unusual exchange. After learning that the Steiner who authored S-W (Andre) was the not the same Steiner who was testifying (Bedřich/Friedrich), the presiding judge asked whether Andre Steiner, the affidavit's author, was still living. "Steiner is in the United States," replied the state attorney. Here was the opportunity to question the author of the most important document tying Husayni to the instigation of extermination policy, death-camp inspections, and close cooperation with Eichmann. But the court did not ask the prosecutor if Andre Steiner had revealed the circumstances under which he wrote the affidavit, whether he had information that would corroborate or contradict it, or whether he would be willing to testify, in person or by writing, in regard to such questions. Instead, the presiding judge ordered S-W entered into evidence, and the trial moved directly on to other matters (Eichmann Trial 1961, Session 50, Parts 5–6).²⁰

Teddy Kollek, the director general of the office of the prime minister, supervised public relations for the trial. Kollek selected Moshe (Maurice) Pearlman, author of the 1947 book on Husayni that included the Perish-Judea story, to compose the government-authorized account of the Eichmann trial. Kollek selected an American writer, Leon Uris, to compose a fictionalized account of the trial (Miller 2002, 136–40). Uris had written the 1958 bestseller *Exodus* that drew on American frontier epics and biblical motifs to present Zionist fighters as pioneers bringing life to

¹⁹ An English translation of the *Map Room* statement, dated July 26, 1946, was entered as court document T/89 (Eichmann Trial 1961, Session 16, Part 3). *S-W* was entered as court document T/1117 (Eichmann Trial 1961, Session 50, Parts 6–7).

²⁰ Bedřich Steiner also stated that his signature on *S-W* was meant only to affirm that he was a witness as Andre Steiner presented the affidavit to the notary.

a wasteland, warding off savage and Nazi-like Arabs, and in doing so, avenging the Holocaust and redeeming the centuries of persecution that preceded it (Uris 1958). In 1965, the Revisionist Zionist writer Joseph Schechtman produced the first book in English devoted to Husayni since Pearlman's 1947 *Mufti of Jerusalem*, in the course of which Schechtman recapitulated Pearlman's "Perish Judea" and supplemented it with *Wiesenthal* 47 (1965, 152–66).

The Holocaust is the most investigated crime in history, as has often been pointed out in response to deniers. Eichmann may be that crime's most investigated criminal. Yet neither the intense effort of Eichmannhunters to track down and gather every possible clue regarding Eichmann's life, nor Eichmann's multiple accounts of his role in the Holocaust, nor the interrogations of Eichmann between his capture and his arrival in Israel, nor the investigations by Bureau 06 established in Israel to prepare the Eichmann case for the prosecution, nor the testimony at the trial, nor the investigative journalism and historical studies that followed, have uncovered evidence that Husayni was a close collaborator of Eichmann, influenced his decisions, or inspected death camps with him.²¹ In the end, the Uris book did not materialize, and Pearlman, whose original book proposal for the Eichmann trial envisioned "a special chapter, if it emerges from the evidence, of the Mufti of Jerusalem's part in the German decision to exterminate the Jews" (Miller 2002, 137), dropped the Newman account—with the exception of a reference to the court's opinion that Eichmann and Husayni likely met in Berlin on one occasion (Pearlman 1963, 596-97). Gideon Hausner, who had led the prosecution of Eichmann and aggressively pursued the Newman angle during the proceedings, wrote his own book on the trial, which contained only one page on Husayni and left out any mention of S-W (Hausner 1966, $345)^{22}$

²¹ For a detailed recent study of Eichmann's career and crimes, see Cesarani 2004. For a new study of the extensive record on Eichmann and Nazi-emigré circles in Argentina and their voluminous statements and writings on the Nazi war against Jews, see Stangneth 2014.

During the trial, Hausner's prosecution team also introduced into evidence a page from Husayni's Arabic diary (dated November 9, 1944) that referred to "a very rare diamond." The word "Eichmann" was written nearby in Latin characters. Chief Inspector Avraham Hagag, the court's handwriting expert, testified that he had not been given a sample of Husayni's Latin script sufficient enough to determine whether Husayni had penned in the name Eichmann. On cross-examination, Hagag revealed that the Latin script used for the word "Eichmann" was not written by the same hand that penned in Latin script on other pages examined, such as those of November 7 and November 10. See Trial Transcripts, Session 74, part 1. In his account of the trial, Hausner gives the impression that the word "Eichmann" had been demonstrated to have been in Husayni's handwriting. He also gives the impression that the credibility of the Wisliceny *Map Room* scenario had been affirmed by the court (Hausner 1966, 345).

Historian Peter Novick noted that Husayni was given "a starring role" in the four-volume *Encyclopedia of the Holocaust*, published by Yad Vashem in 1990: "The article on the Mufti is more than twice as long as the articles on Goebbels and Goering, longer than the articles on Himmler and Heydrich combined, longer than the article on Eichmann—of all the biographical articles, it is exceeded in length, but only slightly, by the entry for Hitler" (2000, 158). Yet although it could hardly be accused of minimizing Husayni's role, the encyclopedia refrained from validating or even mentioning Husayni's alleged instigation of extermination policy, collaboration with Eichmann, or inspection of death camps.

Significant attention has been given to subsequent polemics in the Middle East over the Holocaust, by Israelis casting Arab foes of Israel as Nazis intent on a new Holocaust (Zertal 2005, 95–197; Segev 1993, 387–404), and by Arabs and other proclaimed supporters of Palestinians who have portrayed Israelis as Nazi-like and Palestinians as victims of a new Holocaust (Litvak and Webman 2009). It is not my intention here to offer judgments on the competing claims of Israeli and Palestinian national movements regarding the Holocaust and its relationship to the establishment of Israel, each of which has a deep and compelling history. Rather, having reviewed the development of the Perish-Judea story to this point, I turn now to its recent appropriation and exploitation within American society.

4. Holocaust Abuse

In *Denying the Holocaust*, Deborah Lipstadt wrote that Holocaust denial constituted "an assault on truth and memory." She acknowledged that Holocaust denial literature might seem marginal, consigned as it was to informal publications, but warned that it was taking on the appearance of responsible research by reinventing itself as revisionism and that it should not be supported "in the name of free speech, free inquiry, or intellectual freedom" (Lipstadt 1993, 4–5, 24–25). Although Holocaust denial is not a crime in the United States, instances or allegations of Holocaust denial are met with public opprobrium and, in a case to be discussed below, have been held out as a pretext for war.²³

²³ In 2007, Alan Dershowitz intervened in the tenure review being carried out by De Paul University for Norman Finkelstein, an assistant professor of political science. Finkelstein's department and division had voted to support his tenure. After Dershowitz launched a high-profile attack on Finkelstein's writings on what Finkelstein called "the Holocaust Industry," the tenure review proceeded within a politically charged atmosphere and the DePaul administration ultimately rejected the departmental and divisional tenure recommendation. The administration denied that its final decision to deny Finkelstein tenure was influenced by the Dershowitz intervention, even as Dershowitz credits it with playing an important role in the decision. See Dershowitz 2005, 173–88; Finkelstein 2005, 229–278;

In what follows, I discuss the reemergence of Perish-Judea narratives in the United States, and measure them by the standards of responsible historiography that were cited above. My criticism is not directed against the fields of Holocaust and Genocide studies as those fields have emerged and developed over the past decades.²⁴ The problem arises in the wider domain of public historiography. Whether the books are published by small or parochial presses, large commercial publishing houses, or academically affiliated establishments such as Cambridge University Press and Yale University Press, readers will often find what might seem a credible apparatus of historiography: notes, copies of documental sources, supporting blurbs from other authors, bibliographies, and indexes. Nonspecialist readers may not notice that the sources themselves are problematic; that their manner of production and possible agendas and bias have not been explained; and that the insinuations or unproven claims of wider Arab or Muslim support for the Nazi "final solution" may constitute the "nazification" of parts or all of those populations—to employ a term used by Idith Zertal in the context of Israeli politics (Zertal 2005, 196).

The revival of Perish-Judea narratives in the United States began in 1993 with Benjamin Netanyahu's book A Place Among the Nations. In it, Netanyahu addresses the American public, urging rejection of the Oslo peace process and arguing that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its chairman Yassir Arafat should not be accepted as negotiating partners. Netanyahu's Perish-Judea narrative appears in a chapter titled "Trojan Horse." After presenting Husayni as one of the masterminds and most dedicated supporters of the Nazi extermination program (based almost entirely on the accounts of Pearlman and Schechtman), he goes on to portray Arafat and the PLO as willing heirs of Husayni's alleged exterminationist Nazism. The sole examples of the purported PLO admiration for Nazism cited by Netanyahu are sourced to remarks or unpublished papers of an Israeli security analyst and anti-Oslo activist, Yigal Carmon.²⁵ Other American opponents of peace negotiations with the PLO linked Arafat to Nazism in increasingly strident terms through his allegedly ideological or even blood relationship with Husayni.

In 1994, New York mayor Rudy Giuliani humiliated Arafat by demanding that he (Arafat) leave a Lincoln Center concert, for which Arafat had

Dershowitz 2009, 112–17; and the letters to the editor by Dershowitz and Peter Novick in "An Extramural Struggle over Tenure" (Dershowitz and Novick 2007).

²⁴ In addition to scholarly works cited and relied upon in this essay, I might mention a few others that bear on the lives and reactions of Arabs and Africans before and during World War II, such as Scheck 2006; Gershoni 2010; Bashkin 2012; Scheck 2012; Bernhard 2012; Guttstadt 2013; and Motadel 2014.

²⁵ See Netanyahu 1993, 194, 450–51n34–35. On Carmon, see Karpin and Friedman 1998, 137–38; as well as Timmerman 2003, 64–70, 111, who draws on Carmon's off-the-record comments for his own Perish-Judea account.

a valid ticket, celebrating the anniversary of the UN. Giuliani's intervention had few precedents: it was a staged shaming of an internationally recognized leader with whom American policy makers (as well as the Israeli government) had been working intensely to form enough mutual trust to move toward a settlement of one of the most tragic and geopolitically explosive conflicts since the end of World War II.

In 1998, Arafat declared his intention to visit the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, with strong encouragement from the American Middle East negotiating team and the apparent permission of the museum authorities. It would have been the first gesture of its kind by an Arab leader since Egyptian President Anwar Sadat visited Yad Vashem more than two decades earlier. The museum's director later announced that no official visit from Arafat would be countenanced. Although opinions differ on why and how the apparent permission was retracted, the result was yet another searing public humiliation of the Palestinian leader.

In the wake of the violent collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian talks and the shock of the 9/11 terror attacks that followed the next year, Perish-Judea accounts have proliferated. They include at least nine books published in the United States, as well as numerous articles, films, and websites directed toward American audiences. 26 The authors and producers are of diverse professional, political, and religious backgrounds, and the publishers include religious, politically conservative, commercial, and academic presses. The Perish-Judea sections of these works, like that of Netanyahu's, are based almost exclusively on K-W, S-W, Map Room, and Wiesenthal 47, usually taken second-hand from Pearlman 1947, Crum 1947, or Schechtman 1965. The new accounts also link the alleged exterminationist Nazism of Husayni to alleged heirs of his Nazi legacy: Arafat, the PLO, Arab and Islamic radicalism, jihadism; or to purported affinities between Nazism and Islam. Husayni has also featured in three films as an iconic figure for the Nazi or worse-than-Nazi nature of radical Islam or Islam itself. More than twenty million DVD copies of one of these films, Obsession, were distributed to registered voters during the U.S. 2008 presidential campaign.

The popularity of the Perish-Judea story received further stimulus with the 2005 election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the presidency of Iran and his subsequent inflammatory statements regarding the Holocaust. "Today, they have created a myth in the name of Holocaust and consider it to be

²⁶ For periodicals and books, many of which will be discussed below, see Trifkovic 2002, 155–88; Longgrear and McNemar 2000; Timmerman 2003, 107–14; Morse 2003, 62–69; Friedman 2004, 338–39; Dalin 2005b, 135–38; Dalin and Rothmann 2008, 45–65; Vermaat 2008; Mallmann and Cüppers 2010, 98–101; Dershowitz 2009, 196–203; Patterson 2011, 91–124; 2012, 207–8; Rubin and Schwanitz 2014, 1–10, 164–91, 190–94.

above God, religion and the prophets," he was quoted saying to an audience in the Iranian city of Zahedan in December 2005 (Associated Press 2005). Beneath the cultivated insensitivity of his rhetoric was a syllogistic argument that can be summarized as follows: You (that is, "you in the West") say that you committed this great crime against Jews in World War II. You call that crime a Holocaust, by which you mean a crime so grave that it required compensation to the survivors of the people who suffered from it, in the form of a nation-state. According to all standards of restitution, the party that pays the restitution should be the one that committed the crime. Therefore, since you committed this crime, "why don't you give part of your land in Europe, the United States, Canada or Alaska" for Jews to establish their state (Associated Press 2005)?²⁷ Instead, you established a new Jewish state in Palestine, on a land and among a people who had "nothing to do" with that crime. Ahmadinejad offered no serious suggestion that European or North American nations would grant such a state, or that Israeli Jews would accept it and the dislocation it would entail. The issue of restitution he raised, however, is an old one, dating back to the postwar arguments of Samir Shammai and other Arab lobbyists and diplomats.

He reprised his argument in a 2009 interview with George Stephanopoulos of ABC News in the form of two questions:

My first question was, if the Holocaust happened, where did it take place? In Europe. Why should they make amends in Palestine? The Palestinian people had no role to play in the Holocaust. They had no role, for that matter, in the Second World War. Racism happened in Europe, the amends are made in Palestine? My second question about the Holocaust, if this is indeed a historical event: why do they want to turn it into a holy thing? And nobody should be allowed to ask any questions about that? Nobody study it, research it [sic]. (ABC News 2009)

Like the suggestion that Israel be moved to Europe, the proclaimed defense of Holocaust research was tendentious, to say the least. The Holocaust conference he hosted in Tehran offered a forum for those who challenged the historicity of the Holocaust (including former Ku Klux Klan leader David Duke) without concern for basic standards of research. Here again, beneath the tendentiousness, was an argument: You in the West criticize us for criminalizing blasphemy against things we consider holy and project yourselves as defenders of freedom of expression, but in the case of your own holy thing, you criminalize or anathematize those who question it.

²⁷ For similar remarks at other occasions, see Channel NewsAsia 2007; Elliot 2007; and Antonowicz 2007.

Ahmadinejad's polemics ignited a firestorm. Columbia University came under fierce criticism for inviting him to speak on campus in 2007. On June 20, 2007, the House of Representatives passed by a vote of 411–2 H. Conf. Res. 21, calling on the United Nations Security Council "to take up charges against Iranian leader Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for violating the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and Article 2, Section 4, of the United Nations Charter," citing Iranian government hostility toward Israel and Ahmadinejad's sponsorship of a conference "denying the historical validity of the Holocaust" (House of Representatives 2007). Article 8 of the Convention states that "any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate" (UN General Assembly 1948). A U.S. invocation of the Convention could open the way toward military intervention against Iran unless and until it affirmed the Holocaust.

One Perish-Judea narrative addressed Ahmadinejad's argument in a particularly explicit fashion. The Iranian president was wrong in saying that Palestinians had "nothing to do" with the Holocaust, Alan Dershowitz wrote. On the contrary, Dershowitz maintained, "Palestinian leadership and masses" actively supported a genocidal war and continued to revere Husayni even after the war "despite—more likely, because his active role [sic] in the genocide against the Jewish people" (Dershowitz 2009, 202–3).

Among those who have indicted Arabs as a group for alleged eagerness to participate in a Husayni-led extermination of the Jews of the Middle East are two German authors, Klaus-Michael Mallmann and Martin Cüppers, whose book has been translated into English as Nazi Palestine and co-published by the American Holocaust Memorial Museum and Enigma Books. In it, they write that the "Middle East's open admiration for National Socialism is historiographically proven," that Nazi plans to exterminate Jews in the Middle East "would have received widespread and active support from the Arabs," and that it is imperative today to reach a verdict on the role of "the Arabs" in the Holocaust (2010, 215, 217, emphasis mine). The evidence put forth for mass Arab support of Nazism consists of the formation of a Nazi group led by SS Colonel Walter Rauff that was to lead the destruction of Jewry in the event of Nazi victory in the Middle East and that recruited a number of Arabs—a point they document, but which indicates nothing about popular Arab admiration for National Socialism or collective guilt for the Holocaust. To bolster their broader claim, they present self-congratulatory reports by Nazi officials who were propagandizing among Arabs and non-Arab Muslims. These reports boast of the support of the masses for Nazism and their religious veneration of Hitler, as well as the alleged readiness of the Arab and Muslim masses worldwide to stand with the Axis. Most of the reports, written by officials with every reason to claim to their supervisors that they were succeeding in their

mission, are presented at face value, as are selective statements by a few western travelers or Arab writers, with no explanation of why such mass Arab and Muslim support for the Nazi cause failed to manifest itself in North Africa, the Middle East, or India in any significant way.²⁸

The specter of a "Nazi Palestine" in the hypothetical event of Axis victory in the war has been shaped for an American readership. The Perish-Judea literature remains steadfastly silent on the depth and prevalence of prewar and wartime American judeophobia as well as the immovable public resistance to providing haven or temporary refuge for European Jews beyond the restricted quotas established in 1924. Nor do such allegations of past or present Arab and Muslim Nazi proclivities adequately identify and locate the very real phenomenon of judeophobic discourse within some Arabic and Muslim communities today. It is important in this regard to distinguish the prejudice against national groups brought about through war identity—a popular, generalized enmity or prejudice toward those associated with an enemy nation-state—from phobic discourse. In the wake of the Israel-Palestine dispute, the

²⁸ See Mallmann and Cüppers (2010, 30–31), who treat as dispositive claims by the SS General Erwin Ettel that Iranians were viewing Hitler as the messianic reappearance of the Twelfth Shi'ite Imam and by a "French physician" (Pierre Schrumpf-Pierron, an Abwehr agent) that Muslims viewed Hitler as a "jinni" and "as a prophet who opposes the Jews." (For a careful discussion of Mallmann and Cüppers in the contemporary German context, see Wien, 2010; see also, Stangneth 2014, 442n141). Dalin and Rothmann write that the "predisposition of the Arab people toward Nazism" was emergent by 1938 (2008, 134). Friedman quotes a remark by journalist John Gunther on Hitler as the greatest contemporary hero in the Middle East of 1942, to which he adds his own paraphrase of a purported blood-chilling call for the imminent annihilation of Palestinian Jews by "mukhtars and mullahs," whom he does not name and about whom he offers no information (2004, 341–42). Patterson states that Husayni asked Himmler "to do all he could to complete the extermination of the Jews. That such a sentiment was not peculiar to the Muslim Husayni is confirmed by an entry in the diary of Joseph Goebbels dated 26 April 1944: 'The four hundred million of the Muhammad-Arabic population are absolutely there for us" (2011, 117-18). That Goebbels's claim, in this case as in others, may have confirmed nothing but his own wishful thinking, does not seem to occur to the author. After citing the remark by the journalist Edgar Ansel Mowrer that "in the evil of his intentions Husayni surpassed Hitler," Patterson adds that "throughout his jihadist career al-Husayni was acting not as a renegade but rather as the generally acknowledged leader of the Muslim world," but offers no evidence for this acknowledgment among Muslims (2011, 124).

²⁹ The major primary source for American anti-Jewish hate production is the four-volume *The International Jew* that was sponsored by Henry Ford and put together by a team of writers and investigators working for Ford's *Dearborn Independent* newspaper. It influenced Hitler and other future leaders of the Nazi party and contributed to the racist and anti-Semitic backlash on immigration that would last throughout the Nazi period. For the judeophobic and pro-Nazi sentiments in America, see Lee 1980, Dinnerstein 1994, Warren 1996, and Baldwin 2001. For the political or administrative defeat of numerous proposals to offer Jews refuge or temporary asylum in the mainland United States, Alaska, the Virgin Islands, or other U.S. territories, including the Wagner-Rodgers bill that would have accepted 20,000, mostly Jewish children, see Wyman 1968; Morse 1968; and Rosen 2006.

distinction between national groups as defined by nation-states as opposed to groups defined by larger ethnic or religious associations has been particularly fragile. Partisans on both sides tend to conflate Jews with Israelis and Arabs or Muslims with Palestinians.

Phobic discourse, by contrast, intensifies and fixes prejudice beyond any particular conflict even as it renders specific conflicts more intractable. Judeophobic discourse in the post-1945 Middle East includes several elements: *self-scripturalist* (with decontextualized use of Christian or Islamic traditions to dehumanize or vilify Jews); *enemy-scripturalist* (decontextualized use of real and fabricated Jewish traditions to present Jews as inhuman or evil); *conspiracy-obsessive*; and *ritual* (such as the anti-Talmudic and blood-libel literature). Those elements existed in the Middle East prior to the rise of Nazism. As for racial phobia with its denial of the possibility of Jewish conversion and its pseudo-science of evolution and genetics—there is little evidence that it has found traction within Christian or Muslim Arab societies.³⁰

More generally, the American publications in question here demonstrate a self-reinforcing field of authority and certitude. On the question of death-camp inspections, for example, Dalin and Rothmann write that "As Peter Malkin and Harry Stein have documented, in 1943 and 1944, accompanied by Eichmann, he [the mufti] had secretly inspected Treblinka, Majdanek, and Auschwitz, closely questioning the guides on the workings of the facilities" (2008, 181; quoting Malkin and Stein 1990, 38, emphasis mine). Peter Malkin and Harry Stein offered in fact no citations, sources, time frames, or testimonies whatsoever for their claim, although their language suggests that their account is in fact a slightly less colorful version of Reynolds 1960, which was equally lacking in documentation. Dershowitz then draws on the authority of Dalin and Rothmann's "well documented' account of Husayni's role in the Holocaust" (Dershowitz 2009, 200, emphasis mine). David Patterson relies on the authority of Serge Trifkovic for his own claims that Husayni badgered Nazi officials "to complete the extermination of Jews" even as he praises

³⁰ For the most detailed history of ritual judeophobia in Arabic writings and an exposé of the fallacies and pseudo-scholarship upon which it is based, see Razzuq 1970. For an example of a book advancing extreme judeophobia, see Sa'dani 1969, a book that was published by the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs in Egypt. The book combines perpetuation of the blood-libel with a translation of the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. It also includes claims that Jewish converts to Islam constitute a danger, claims that were advanced by the Turkish judeophobic writer, Cevat Rifat Atilhan, but despite the efforts of Sa'dani to popularize such a stance among Arabs, there has been little evidence that it has gained a hold within Christian and Muslim Arab anti-Jewish polemic. For a discussion and critique of claims that early Baath party leaders were driven by Nazi racialist ideology, see Achcar 2010, 64–74. For examples of self-scripturalist judeophobia discourse within some Islamic circles and its mirroring in other-scripturalist islamophobic discourse within some American circles, see Sells 2012.

Trifkovic for "convincingly" demonstrating that the most potent heirs of Nazism today "are schools, religious leaders, and mainstream intellectuals in the Muslim, meaning primarily Arab, world" (Patterson 2011, 119–20 and 2012, 208; citing Trifkovic 2002, 187; Patterson 2011, 2; quoting Trifkovic 2002, 188). Readers of Trifkovic will find scant evidence for such claims, though they will read that "Islam is a collective psychosis seeking to become global, and any attempt to compromise with such madness is to become part of the madness itself" (Trifkovic 2002, 300). In regard to Muslims who do not support an exterminationist understanding of their tradition, Trifkovic explains that they are "bad Muslims, because they reject key teachings of historical Islam" (2002, 300). 31

The new Perish-Judea literature adds one notable new accusation: that the Waffen SS (Handschar) division Husayni helped establish took an important role in the destruction of Croatian and Bosnian Jewry, with some accounts stating that 90% of Bosnian Jews perished at the hands of the Handschars.³² These authors did not check the established

³¹ Readers will not learn from Trifkovic's biographical blurb that Trifkovic was public relations adviser for the self-declared Republika Srpska (Serbian Republic [RS]) in Bosnia from 1993–95 and personal adviser to two RS presidents, Radovan Karadžić, who is now on trial for genocide at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and Biljana Plavšić who declared in 1994 that that it was impossible to negotiate with Bosnian Muslims, who were the degraded descendants of "genetically defective material that embraced Islam" and thus incapable of reasoned discussion (Sells 1998, xv) and who later pled guilty to extermination and other crimes against humanity. From July 12–16, 1995, Trifkovic was in the RS capital of Pale for intense talks with Karadžić and other RS leaders, as RS forces were carrying out the massacre of Bosnian Muslim men and boys taken from the United Nations designated safe area of Srebrenica. See International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 2008, 25210–15.

³² "Bosnian 'Mujo' legionnaires murdered thousands of Serbs and Jews in Croatia and killed more civilians in Lithuania" (Friedman 2004, 338); "The Bosnian Muslim Handzar SS Division was responsible for the destruction of whole Bosnian Jewish and Serbian communities, including the massacre of Jews and Serbs, and the deportation of survivors to Auschwitz for extermination" (Bostom 2002); the Handschar division "became known for its brutal and bloody methods of warfare against Jews, communists, and Partisans" (Herf 2009, 201); Husayni "organized the killing of thousands of Bosnian Jews by Muslims, whom he recruited to the Waffen-SS Nazi-Bosnian division" (Dershowitz 2009, 200). Longgrear and McNemar write that the Handschars "slaughtered 90% of the Jews in Bosnia" (2000); Timmerman repeats the 90% figure (1993, 110), citing Longgrear and McNemar. Dalin (2005a, 4; 2005b, 136-37) and Dalin and Rothmann (2008, 57) repeat the figure of 90% and calculate that 12,500 Bosnian Jews perished through Handschar actions. More recently, Rubin and Schwanitz write that the Handschar division "became known for atrocities against Jews and partisans in the Balkans and France" (2014, 151); confound the Handschar division with the 21st Waffen-SS division that was founded in Albania (2014, 151, photo subtitle and text); and write that the Handschars "had participated in massacring thousands of Bosnian Jews, Christian Serbs, and Roma ('Gypsies')" (2014, 190). I can find no information on the historical credentials of Paul Longgrear and Raymond McNemar whose story of the Handschars' murder of 90% of Bosnian Jews would reappear in the works of Timmerman, Dalin, and Rothmann noted above. Their article featured in the April/May, chronology of the Holocaust in the Balkans. At the onset of the war, forty thousand Jews lived in the Fascist Independent State of Croatia (NDH) that included what are now the independent nations of Croatia and Bosnia. On June 26, 1941, Croatian dictator Ante Pavelic ordered the mass detention of Jews throughout the NDH. Pavelic's fascist units, known as the Ustashe, began the round-ups in Croatia proper and then moved on to Bosnia. By November 1941, they had completed the detention of Jews in Sarajevo. By the end of 1941, two-thirds of the Jews in the NDH had been imprisoned in concentration camps, where thousands were murdered, starved to death, or died from disease. In early 1942, Nazi officials ordered the transfer of surviving NDH Jews to Auschwitz and other death camps outside of the NDH. After the last large deportation in May 1943, only a remnant of the Jewish population survived within the NDH, concentrated in Zagreb (Gutman 1990, 323–39). All of this occurred before the Handschar division was deployed.

Inductions into the Handschar division had been organized in the spring of 1943, after which the division was sent to German-occupied France for training. Volunteers mutinied at the training site in the town of Villefranche de Rouergue, captured nine German and ethnic German commanders, and executed five of them in serial fashion. It took the German authorities some time to call in reinforcements, reverse and then quash the rebellion, track down and execute its leaders, purge those in the rank and file who participated in the revolt or were viewed as unreliable soldiers, further Germanize the officer corps, and organize a new training site in Germany (Lepre 1997, 81–139). It was not until late February 1944 that the division returned to the NDH, where it was deployed against Marshal Tito's Partisan units in eastern Bosnia. By that time there would have been few Jews still living in the area.³³

2000 edition of the "Media Digest" page of the Christian Zionist organization Canadian Friends of the International Christian Embassy in Jerusalem at http://www.cdn-friends-icej.ca/medigest/may00/arabnazi.html. It was last captured by the Wayback Machine of the Internet Archive on that site on April 3, 2013. The same article was mirrored from August 8, 2002 to December 29, 2012 on the website of Christian Action for Israel at http://christianactionforisrael.org/antiholo/arabnazi.html. It can still be found on the Wayback Machine by searching the two URLs above. After August 2002, both sites displayed the article along with links to other articles associating Yasser Arafat with Nazism: Joseph Farah, "Arafat, the Nazi," *The Israel Report*, August 14, 2002; David N. Bossie, "Yasser Arafat: Nazi Trained," *The Israel Report*, August 9, 2002; and Itamar Marcus, "Nazi Ally, Hajj Amin Al Husayni, is Arafat's Hero," *The Israel Report*, August 5, 2002.

³³ There is a plausible report that in April 1944 a Handschar patrol murdered a number of Jewish civilians in the eastern Bosnian town of Zvornik after their Jewish identity was betrayed. See Lowenthal 1957, 71–72. And Partisan forces, which included fighters from Catholic, Orthodox Christian, Jewish, and Muslim communities, may have suffered Jewish fatalities in their battles with the Handschars.

At this point I return to the criteria for distinguishing responsible revision of Holocaust history from Holocaust denial and to my initial proposal that the same standards need to be applied to other potential abuses of Holocaust history. In regard to standards for responsible use of sources—"that the historian place information in context, document claims and sources, [and] acknowledge possible bias or agendas in sources" (Bartov 2000, 12)—the new Perish-Judea literature fails consistently. Each new work presents the story as if it were based on new or newly substantiated evidence, all the while recycling the same three sources—*K-W*, *S-W*, and *Map Room*.

In one revealing passage, Dalin and Rothmann trace the inspiration of their work to their 1968 visit to the Yad Vashem Museum in Jerusalem and, in particular, to the enlarged picture of Adolf Hitler and Hajj Amin al-Husseini they came upon there (2008, preface). They also pay tribute to Eliahu (Epstein) Elath, "who first encouraged us to write a book about the life and legacy of the mufti, his role in the Holocaust and in the rise of radical Islam" and who "continued to urge us to write such a book that would document the mufti's unholy legacy, a story that Eliahu Elath believed needed to be more widely known and better understood" (2008, 145–46). The two maintained a correspondence with Elath, who provided them with a copy of a study of Husayni he had written for the Jewish Agency in 1937 and who continued to encourage them in their endeavor. Yet there is no indication in their writings that they asked for, or that Elath volunteered, any information on Husayni post-1937 or, most importantly, on the three documents on which Perish-Judea is based; whether Wisliceny's story in this matter (as opposed to his many other, far more detailed testimonies on Eichmann and the Holocaust) has any credibility; and how it was that those three documents were obtained and disseminated. Elath, one of the original promoters of the Perish-Judea narrative, would have likely had information on precisely those questions. I can find no indication in any of the works discussed here that their authors asked for or were given information by Elath or any of those with whom he worked in putting together the Perish-Judea story. Although Kastner died in 1957, Bedřich Steiner in 1983, and Pearlman in 1986, the other principals—Ruffer (Rafael) who lived until 1999, Kollek until 2007, Andre Steiner until 2009, and Pier (Ben-Natan) until 2015—could have been asked and could have provided vital information on the genesis, nature, and credibility of the three core documents.

The case of Andre Steiner is particularly poignant. When the Eichmann-trial prosecutor explained to the judge that it was Bedřich Steiner who was testifying as the prosecution moved to have Andre Steiner's *S-W* affidavit entered into the record, Andre Steiner was living in Atlanta, Georgia, where he had settled after the war and resumed his prewar profession of architecture. In his final years he appeared in video

footage being interviewed on his wartime experience as well as in a film narrating the visit he took with his sons retracing the trail of his escape from Slovakia. In neither of these two venues, produced by those with no connection to Perish-Judea narrative, did he mention Husayni (see Steven Spielberg Film and Video Archive 1978–79; Lichtenstein 1999). He passed away in Atlanta on April 2, 2009 at the age of 100. Even as the Perish-Judea literature has exploited his *S-W* affidavit, it has ignored his life and experiences as a rescue worker as well as any retrospective thoughts he might have had on the Husayni matter. In the latest Perish-Judea work, Andre Steiner disappears from the record as a person. Neither he nor Bedřich Steiner are mentioned, and when the authors cite the claims made in *S-W*, as they were brought into the Eichmann trial, they attribute them to "Prosecutor Steiner" (Rubin and Schwanitz 2014, 163n133).³⁴

Regarding the final criterion—"in all cases present with clarity the major narrative that is to be revised" (Bartov 2000, 12): no written Holocaust order from Hitler has been found and he may not have issued one; direct written or oral communication regarding the extermination program was discouraged; and a language of euphemism was used to keep the operations hidden from the outside world and from the targeted Jewish populations (USHMM 2014a). Historically accepted as well is the fervid ethno-nationalist character of Nazi Germany, which resulted in few non-ethnic Germans being privy to sensitive state matters. The new Perish-Judea literature, by contrast, presents Husayni, an Arab fugitive with no state, army, or organized constituency, as intervening in high Nazi circles, persuading or helping persuade Hitler to commit to the policy of extermination; receiving Himmler's promise for a special advisor from Eichmann's staff; receiving and approving lectures from Eichmann on the details of the final solution; actually instructing Eichmann on how to carry out the policy; and with or without his green turban and with or without his coterie, not only visiting Nazi camps, but entering into their most sensitive and highly guarded areas or even singling out the best crematoria workers for praise. In regard to "ethical standards in taking testimony from witnesses and survivors," no significant testimony from survivors or from witnesses other than Wisliceny has been cited in support of the core Perish-Judea narrative. 35 Overall, the post-1993

³⁴ Assistant State's Attorney Gavriel Barr was representing the prosecution during the questioning of Bedřich Steiner and the discussion of Andre Steiner. I can find no one of the name Steiner listed as a member of the prosecutorial team.

³⁵ An exception is Emerson Vermaat, who cites a survivor of the Monowitz camp (also known as Auschwitz III). The witness stated that he "saw 50 men wearing strange clothes and golden belts, accompanied by high ranking SS officers from *Stammlager* (=original camp) Auschwitz," and that when he asked about the men, an SS officer explained that they were "the Mufti of Jerusalem and his retinue who wanted to see how the Jews worked themselves

Perish-Judea literature published in the United States has been marked by a progressive increase in the certitude with which the narrative is presented, the academic prominence of the presses that publish it, and obfuscation in regard to the sources of the story, even as that story has been tied to claims or insinuations about the beliefs and actions of Arabs and Muslims before, during, or after the Holocaust.

In this essay I have traced the Perish-Judea Holocaust narrative from its emergence in the aftermath of World War II through its intrusion into the 1961 Eichmann trial to its recent revival in literature addressed primarily to an American readership. The post-1993 Perish-Judea literature discussed transgresses or ignores the recognized standards of Holocaust historiography. Because those standards have been associated primarily, if not exclusively, with the problem of Holocaust denial, it finds itself unencumbered by them. Indeed, it presents itself as an expression of genuine Holocaust recognition and a voice of righteous judgment.

The Holocaust Encyclopedia of The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum begins by stating that: "Holocaust denial and minimization or distortion of the facts of the Holocaust is a form of antisemitism" (USHMM 2014b). The claim that the Bosnian SS Handschar division played a major role in the destruction of Bosnian and Croatian Jewry may well be a "distortion of the facts of the Holocaust," but it is not a form of antisemitism. Yet even if the limitation of denial, minimization, and distortion to forms of antisemitism were removed, much of the Perish-Judea narrative, though clearly in violation of each of the Bartov criteria discussed above, would continue to elude scrutiny. Our shared civil value of Holocaust recognition will be further subsumed in the more unreflective, triumphalist currents of American exceptionalism. Retrieving it requires the adoption of a consistent societal ethic regarding Holocaust history, with the distinctions between responsible and irresponsible revisionism that have been elaborated in regard to Holocaust denial extended to other forms of historiographical Holocaust abuse.36

to death, so that he could do the same things to the Jews who lived in Palestine." No information on the procedures followed in interviewing the survivor or in publicizing his story is provided (Vermaat 2008).

³⁶ An earlier version of this essay and the response that follows were presented at the annual conference of the Society for the Study of Muslim Ethics (SSME) on January 13, 2013. With gratitude to the SSME, the Society of Jewish Ethics, and the Society of Christian Ethics; to Ronald M. Green for his thoughtful and challenging response; to Barry Ferst and Carroll College in Helena, Montana, for inviting me to share some of these ideas in an April 12, 2012 address; to Sohail Hashmi, David Nirenberg, Rick Rosengarten, and Bernard Wasserstein for reading an earlier draft and discussing it with me; to Francesca Chubb-Confer, Elizabeth Sartell, and Thomas Whittaker for their editorial assistance; and to David Teutsch for his thoughtful comments at the 2013 conference.

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