

THE HOLOCAUST AND THE RISE OF ISRAEL: A REASSESSMENT REASSESSED

Abraham J. Edelheit

The two momentous events that define Jewish history in the twentieth century, the Holocaust and the rise of the State of Israel, may be viewed as polar opposites in the spectrum of Jewish political power: the Holocaust represents the nadir of Jewish powerlessness, while the actions that culminated in the State of Israel's revival represent the use of all diplomatic resources then available to Jewry. However, lingering questions remain about the connection — beyond mere chronological coincidence — between the two events. This essay attempts to assess the role played by the Holocaust as a catalyst that speeded up the national building project begun by Theodor Herzl. The Holocaust acted to significantly alter the scale and timetable of Zionist activities so that independence was attainable in a matter of years rather than in decades. Measurable changes that can be attributed to the persecution of German and (after 1939) European Jewry include the turn to mass aliya, a willingness to specify Zionist goals, and the transformation of Zionism from one element in the Jewish polity to the central element in all surviving Jewish communities.

Introduction

The plenary session of the World Jewish Congress meeting in Montreux, Switzerland, fell silent as Dr. Nahum Goldmann mounted the podium to begin his keynote address. The month was June 1948, just a few weeks after the State of Israel had been proclaimed and a mere three years after the end of the war in Europe. As one eyewitness, a member of the staff, later reported, Goldmann got off to a late start. In fact, it was almost lunchtime before Goldmann mounted the podium promising to keep his review of the last sixteen years brief. Six and a half hours later, when Goldmann completed his oration, dinner had not yet been served; no one in the audience had moved a muscle and the only sound heard was the sound of pencils and pens scratching against paper as some of the most important Jewish leaders took notes on Goldmann's two main topics: the Nazi attempt to exterminate European Jewry and the emergence of the State of Israel.¹

Fifty years have passed, but the subject is as important now as it was then: the questions raised by the Holocaust and the rise of the State of Israel — most significantly the causal relation between *hurban* (destruction) and *tekuma* (rebirth) — remain as worthy of intensive investigation as ever. It may, in fact, be more worthy of intensive investigation now — as the generation of eyewitnesses and participants passes on and leaves to historians the task of addressing a relationship that has been largely taken for granted (without specific evidence one way or the other) up to now.²

Before proceeding, however, let us address two major semantic questions without which any serious discussion on the relationship in question is fairly meaningless. The first is causality. When can we say — with complete confidence — that one event caused another? Did, for instance, World War II “cause” the Cold War? After all, we all know the pitfall of *post hoc ergo propter hoc* — just because one event preceded another does not mean that the earlier event caused the later one. This is especially true when we realize that events of global magnitude (and the Holocaust and rise of Israel certainly were of global magnitude) usually derive from multiple causes. To continue with this analogy, we cannot say with confidence that World War II caused the Cold War for the simple reason that, in investigating the latter's causes, we will find some causes that can be traced back to the 1920s, if not earlier.³

Even when one event has multiple causes, we can often discern that one cause outshines all others in significance, and, therefore, may be said to be the critical cause. We would then conclude that among a multiplicity of causes leading from one event to another, one was so important that it virtually acted as a catalyst, or, to use a much overworked expression, a bridge between one state of being and another. This is, to again call upon an analogy not directly germane to our subject, the main interpretation used by American historians to explain the relationship between slavery and the Civil War. Insofar as slavery was not the only issue separating the North and South, it was not the only cause for hostilities in 1861. However, if slavery is removed from the agenda, it appears unlikely that the Civil War would have been fought. Slavery was thus not the only cause, but it was the most important among many causes — the catalyst, if you will — for America's Civil War.⁴ The same is true for the relationship between the Holocaust and the rise of Israel, for the reasons set out below.

When we speak of the Holocaust, what do we mean? Over the last fifty years, most scholars have emphasized the totality of the Nazi era — that is, the period from 1933 to 1945. In turn, this broad era must be subdivided into phases (most historians use a four-fold division) whose exact impact on each other, and on the world as a whole, need to be addressed both individually and collectively.⁵ In contrast, a minority of scholars have opted to use the term "Holocaust" more narrowly, confining it to the period (i.e., 1941-1945) when the Nazis actually attempted to exterminate European Jewry. For our purposes, it is germane to note that the more restrictive a chronological definition of the term "Holocaust," the less likely the author is to see any relationship between the Holocaust and the rise of Israel.⁶ Again, most scholars would disagree with such a narrow definition, noting that the dynamic nature of Nazi anti-Semitism led to an increasing tendency toward more severe and brutal policies on Jewish affairs that ultimately culminated in the gas chambers and crematoria. Viewed from this broader chronological perspective, the relationship between the Holocaust and the rise of Israel becomes clearer and can more easily be assessed.

Although the Holocaust was indeed a critical catalyst in the rise of Israel, it is important to remember that the Holocaust was not seen as, nor has ever been, the only "cause" for the State of Israel's creation. The Zionist movement predated the Nazis' rise to power by at least thirty-six years — that is, if we only limit ourselves to a study of the Zionist movement created by Theodor

Herzl in 1897.⁷ In fits and starts, Zionism predated even Herzl, with an organized movement to restore the Jewish people to their homeland — the Hibbat Zion movement — rising approximately sixteen years before the First Zionist Congress. Moreover, even before Hibbat Zion, numerous individuals that we now designate proto-Zionist made the same argument, keeping restoration on the Jewish agenda (even if as a low priority item on that agenda).⁸ One final introductory note seems appropriate: Zionists of all political stripes had an overwhelming sense that some form of catastrophe was imminent. This catastrophe, they felt, would be massive. The socialist Zionist leader Ber Borochov, for example, had warned that “we must liquidate the diaspora before the diaspora liquidates us.”⁹ Although not specifically predicting the Holocaust, similar statements, by Ze’ev Jabotinsky, David Ben-Gurion, and Chaim Weizmann, to name only three, must also be considered relevant to the relationship between the Holocaust and the rise of the State of Israel.¹⁰

Aspects of the Relationship

The persecution of European Jewry acted as a catalyst for what amounted to a Jewish emergence from powerlessness. The Holocaust’s role in this respect manifested itself in three ways: first, in the increasing rate of aliya after 1933; second, in transforming Zionist perceptions of long- and short-range goals, leading them to abandon gradualism and to accept the premise that Zionism meant a Jewish state now; and, finally, in transforming Zionism from a relatively small part of the Jewish communal apparatus into the epicenter of Jewish politics and diplomacy.

Aliya

Although it is easy enough to see that Zionist aliya long predated the Nazi rise to power, it also is clear that the year 1933 represented a sea change in the Yishuv’s fortunes. In 1931, the total Jewish population of mandatory Palestine was recorded at 176,610 or approximately 17 percent of the total population.¹¹ Albeit, at the Yishuv’s rate of growth in the 1920s, Chaim Arlosoroff — who headed the Jewish agency’s political department from 1929 to 1933 and was one of Mapai’s key ideologues — estimated that it would take 163 years for Jews to constitute a majority in

the Jewish national home and thereby fulfill Zionism's major goals.¹²

The persecution of German Jewry and the expansion of Nazi-inspired anti-Semitism in Poland, Hungary, and Romania altered the timetable considerably. By 1939, the Yishuv numbered nearly 450,000 representing almost one-third of Palestine's total population.¹³ Whereas the Zionist experience during the 1920s had been the availability of an adequate, if limited, number of certificates with few takers, in the 1930s, the situation was reversed, leading to many more demands for certificates that were in short supply.¹⁴ A single example may suffice to explain this reality: In October 1934, Bukharian Jewish leaders approached the Jewish Agency for assistance with emigration, citing recently intensified anti-Jewish propaganda that, they were quick to argue, "might also be assigned to Nazi influence."¹⁵

Increased aliya during the 1930s also impacted positively on the Yishuv's economic growth. Indeed, special importance needs to be ascribed in this respect to the Ha'avara Agreement between the Yishuv and Nazi Germany. Although controversial when first proposed in 1933, Ha'avara was the quintessential Zionist response to the Nazi threat — creating the means for Jews to emigrate en masse with part of their capital resources, thereby paving the way for further waves of laboring immigrants to follow. Even a most strident critic (writing in the 1980s) was forced to admit that this so-called deal with the devil helped create the foundations for economic development — which otherwise would have been absent — that assisted in creating the Jewish state.¹⁶

The dangerous world situation, combined with the massive influx of skilled German Jews with capital, created a logic of its own. Whereas in 1920 the WZO largely rejected as unrealistic and unattainable Max Nordau's proposal to bring in 600,000 *olim* in a few years, by 1933 — certainly by 1935 — calls for mass aliya had become basic to Zionist rhetoric. Thus, for instance, in 1935, Revisionist Zionist leader Jabotinsky proposed a mass aliya plan — the so-called Evacuation Scheme — based on the entrance of 1.5 million Jews over ten years. Jabotinsky's main opponent, Jewish Agency Executive chairman Ben-Gurion, proposed a similar scheme at almost the same time, and continued to propose mass aliya schemes as late as 1944.¹⁷ Indeed, even a gradualist like WZO President Chaim Weizmann saw, as early as 1934, that the possibility existed "whereby the Jewish population of Palestine might be doubled within four or five years."¹⁸ Again, this potential for mass aliya and the attainment of a Jewish majority (which

was basic to accomplishing Zionist goals) simply did not exist prior to 1933.

Fundamentally, the same is true for Aliya Bet ("illegal immigration"). To be sure, some Aliya Bet existed for the Mandate's entire history. Albeit, only after 1933 — and especially after the British imposed the so-called political maximum on aliya in 1937 — did Aliya Bet become a major factor in Zionist aliya policy. As the British increasingly limited aliya, desperate Jews resorted to illegal entry means, resulting in further British restrictions and the creating of a vicious cycle broken only when the Mandate was terminated in 1948.¹⁹

As is well known, legal aliya was severely restricted by the British White Paper of 1939 and by the outbreak of World War II. Even Aliya Bet — which was the last desperate choice for a handful of Jews at the Reich's peripheries seeking to evade the Nazis — was an iffy proposition that could accomplish little more than save a tiny remnant of European Jewry.²⁰ By 1945, conditions had changed so radically that the Zionists' minimum demand was the immediate entry of 100,000 Jewish displaced persons (DPs) — in other words, Holocaust survivors (known in Hebrew as *she'erit ha-pleta*) who could not return to their former homes — into Eretz Israel. The demand regarding the 100,000 was part of a broader plan to overturn the White Paper and to achieve what Zionists had nearly attained in the 1930s — a Jewish majority in the Jewish National Home and a Jewish state. The DP problem, in turn, became part and parcel of the postwar Zionist struggle, the culmination of an aliya war proposed by Ben-Gurion in 1939 but abandoned for the duration of World War II.²¹

The postwar struggle was based on the obvious need to find a permanent home for Jewish survivors of Nazi persecution, persons who could not (due to renewed anti-Semitic agitation) or would not return to their homes in Eastern Europe. It has been argued that the Holocaust experience did not initially influence Jewish survivors to concentrate in DP camps in the Anglo-America zones of occupation and that, furthermore, it was the Zionist movement — which already existed — that forged the DPs into a potent political weapon.²² Both these points may indeed be true, but they are also quite beside the point. Insofar as survivors did seek to return to their points of origin, they were not making any form of political statement. Conditions in Eastern Europe — including the survival of vicious anti-Semitism and the uncertainty caused by communist determination to seize control of East European states — precluded Jewish communal rehabilitation. Thereafter, the Jewish DPs did undertake an overtly political act, consciously or-

ganizing themselves for the purpose of opening the gates of the Jewish national home and fulfilling Zionist goals.

This may be seen most clearly from the documents produced by DP Zionists in Landsberg in late 1945, and most particularly from the eleven-point program published by the United Zionist Organization in Germany (UZO), whose center was in Landsberg and which is cited here in full:²³

1. A Jewish state
2. Building the land on a socialist basis
3. Individual work
4. Hope for a United Workers' Movement
5. Conquest of Labor
6. Priority for Agricultural (settlement)
7. Preparation for physical (rehabilitation), spiritual (rebuilding), and defense
8. Working settlement of all types
9. Mutual help and cooperation
10. Hebrew language and culture
11. Aliya by all means

Again, this was a conscious political act by the survivors, who thus participated fully in the Zionist struggle for a Jewish state. The initiative shown by survivors should not be discounted. In addition, the survivors (not the WZO) initiated the Briha (flight) movement that created the DP situation and furnished the Zionists with the powerful moral weapon of Jewish homelessness. True, this weapon was amorphous prior to the WZO's imposition of order and discipline in 1945 and 1946.²⁴ Yet, this weapon would not have existed if not for the DPs. In other words, it is clear that, as a result of the Holocaust, the DPs' fate and the Yishuv's fate were inextricably bound together; a solution for the one problem, ipso facto, had to also provide a solution to the other problem. Without the Holocaust, this element in Zionist diplomacy might have been missing entirely and a Jewish state probably would not have emerged when it did.

To summarize: although Zionist aliya was not caused by the Holocaust, the desperate seriousness with which aliya was taken after 1933 was a function of increasing Jewish distress that was directly or indirectly caused by the Nazis. Aliya was always central to long-range Zionist plans for the gradual development of a Jewish majority in Eretz Israel. These plans were considerably speeded up by the Holocaust — from a span of many decades in the unforeseeable future to a mere twenty years. This is the most

telling example of the Holocaust as a catalyst for the Jewish state, but is by no means the only one.

Transforming Zionist Goals

so true

An equally compelling argument can be made for a progression — that, once again, may be attributed to the changes wrought in Jewry's status as a result of the Nazi rise to power (and subsequent effort to exterminate European Jewry) — in Zionist thought about short- and long-range goals. As was the case with aliya, Zionist conceptions of the ultimate goal — statehood — long predated the Nazis. However, such goals were framed around a very long period of development that most Zionists thought would require decades, if not longer. In practice, this led to a great reluctance to commit to either a specific set of goals (beyond the amorphous concept of building a Jewish national home) and, more significantly, a reluctance to set any specific timetable for attaining Jewish sovereignty. Indeed, during the 1920s and early 1930s, statehood was considered the "*shem ha-meforash*" (ineffable name) of the Zionist movement: like the Divine name it was inferred and implied in circular, coded speech, but was never ever to be pronounced out loud in an explicit fashion.

The case of the Seventeenth Zionist Congress (1931) was typical of most Zionists' attitudes at the time. During the open debate, Jabotinsky proposed a moderately worded resolution calling on the Congress to publicly declare that eventual statehood was its goal. Jabotinsky's resolution assigned no specific timetable for realizing this goal; he merely sought to get the WZO on record as planning for the creation of a Jewish state. Even so, the majority of delegates at the Congress — supporters of a coalition between Mapai and moderate General Zionists (the so-called "A" faction) — saw Jabotinsky's resolution as dangerous (given the events that transpired in Palestine/Eretz Israel and London between 1929 and 1931).²⁵ A large majority therefore voted against the resolution, leading Jabotinsky to a tumultuous action: mounting a chair, the Revisionist Zionist leader tore up his delegate card and declared "this is not a Zionist Congress anymore."²⁶

Six years and three Zionist Congresses later, a plurality of the WZO leadership called for the movement to accept the plan proposed by the Palestine Royal Commission (the Peel Commission) to create a sovereign Jewish state in a partitioned Palestine. Although the story of the Peel Commission has already been care-

fully analyzed by historians of Zionism, almost all have missed the correlation between events in Europe and the sudden reversal in Zionist policy toward long-range goals. Statehood may well have been the Zionists' goal all along, but, prior to 1935/1936 — i.e., prior to the severe worsening of conditions in Germany and Poland and the outbreak of the Arab revolt — only Jabotinsky and the Revisionist movement were willing to say so publicly. However, after conditions worsened in Germany and Poland, many Zionists felt that the events required an immediate response. Furthermore, they felt that only one possible response would suffice: statehood.²⁷

The change in attitudes may be seen most clearly in Ben-Gurion's statements from 1936 and 1937. At a meeting of the Mapei political committee on March 30, 1936, for instance, Ben-Gurion evaluated the situation thus: "we face one burning question: the condition of Jews in Poland and Germany and the necessity to bring them to Eretz Israel."²⁸ At a meeting on the eve of the Peel Commission's arrival with British High Commissioner Sir Arthur Wauchope, Ben-Gurion was even more clear: "The only hope [for Jews in Germany and Poland] was Palestine and every thousand immigrants mattered tremendously."²⁹ Similarly, Weizmann in his two addresses at the Twentieth Zionist Congress (1937) linked the three themes of rescue, aliya, and partition.³⁰ Again, however, Ben-Gurion's voice was the clearest: "Jewish need is very great. The pressure of masses of Jews as well as the pressure of countries that want to get rid of them is constantly growing stronger. The Jewish problem was never as acute as in these days, and outside of Palestine, there is no hope to look forward to. The world is barred against us."³¹

The close connection between the unsettling events in Europe and the Zionist decision to abandon gradualism may also be seen in the 1942 Biltmore Resolution. Produced by the extraordinary Zionist Congress that met in New York City on May 10 and 11, 1942, the resolution was a Zionist response to three years of failures: despite the dire straits of European Jewry and the Yishuv's cooperation in the anti-Nazi war effort, His Majesty's government clung tenaciously to the White Paper of 1939 as a means to purchase Arab neutrality. Furthermore, American Zionists had failed to attract strong support from either the Roosevelt administration or American Jewry to its diplomatic efforts.³²

Although no verified information was available at that time regarding the Final Solution, the fact that European Jewry was in the throes of a great catastrophe was clear to all present. Thus, the conference spoke of the need to relocate two million homeless

Did they talk about rescuing Jews? or just about the creation of the Jewish state?

Jews after World War II at a time when that many Polish, Soviet, and Romanian Jews had already been murdered. Regardless of the lack of specific information, the Biltmore Conference once again re-emphasized the close connection between rescue and fulfillment of Zionist goals as soon as possible. Article Eight specifically declared “that the new world order that will follow victory cannot be established on foundations of peace, justice, and equality unless the problem of Jewish homelessness is finally solved.” The only way for that to happen was for the Yishuv to “be established as a Jewish Commonwealth integrated into the structure of the now democratic world.”³³

While the precise relationship between the Holocaust and the Biltmore Resolution is a matter of conjecture, at least one Zionist figure, Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, argued — at the American Jewish Conference in September 1943 — that, perforce, the only way to rebuild stricken European Jewry after the war was evacuation of the survivors to a Jewish state. Silver particularly emphasized that: “We cannot truly rescue the Jews of Europe unless we have free immigration into Palestine. We cannot have free immigration into Palestine unless our political rights are recognized there. Our political rights cannot be recognized unless our historic connection with the country is acknowledged and our right to rebuild our national home is reaffirmed. These are inseparable links in a chain. The whole chain breaks if one of the links is missing.”³⁴

The Holocaust was viewed as the best proof, if proof was ever really needed, for the creation of the State of Israel, and the experience remained as a palpable, almost daily, background to Israeli foreign and defense policies — to say nothing of immigration and absorption policy — throughout the 1950s.³⁵

As with aliya, it is clear that statehood was, to one degree or another, central to all Zionist streams. Nonetheless, it is also clear that the Holocaust considerably sped up the Zionists’ timetable up, forcing them to consider accomplishing immediately that which had originally been a long-term goal. This was possible because the Holocaust also brought the Zionists to the forefront of Jewish communal politics during the years between 1933 and 1948.

Transforming the Jewish Polity

A good portion of the difficulty in assessing the Holocaust’s impact on the rise of Israel may be derived from a misperception

of the centrality of Zionism to the pre-World War II Jewish community. This is primarily true about the United States, but also holds true of Eastern and Central European countries as well. Thus, for instance, one author notes that the American Zionists' rise to prominence in the American Jewish community coincided with the "heyday" of anti-Semitism in the United States.³⁶ Yet, as late as 1939 — in fact as late as 1942 — American Zionists were lamenting the overall weakness of their appeal within the American Jewish community. That, indeed, was one of the problems which the aforementioned Biltmore Conference hoped to address.³⁷

Recent studies have all concluded that the Zionists — despite their claims of representing the entire Jewish people — did not in fact succeed in converting the Jewish masses to their cause between 1890 and 1939. To be sure, the Zionists represented a vocal plurality within almost every Jewish community in Europe and the Americas.³⁸ Albeit, the Socialist Nationalist Bund (and its American off-shoot, the Jewish Labor Committee), the diaspora nationalist Folkspartei, which reflected the nationalist ideology of Simon Dubnow, the Orthodox anti-Zionist party Agudat Israel, and even the largely discredited Jewish Territorialist Organization (ITO) and its settlement agency (ICA) all remained in active competition for Jewish hearts and minds with the WZO.³⁹

Once again, a clear transformation of this political spectrum happened after World War II and must, at least in part, be attributed to the Holocaust. The great bloodletting in Eastern Europe virtually destroyed the Bund as an effective political force, and did destroy all semblance of diaspora nationalist ideology. The desperate, but unsuccessful, search for a safe haven before and during the war further discredited territorialist ideologies and, again, led to the virtual collapse of non-Zionist plans for the Jewish future.⁴⁰

Agudat Israel's position also moved from anti-Zionist to non-Zionist after World War II. At least in part this was a response to the Holocaust, although to be sure, this was not entirely the case. The transformation of Agudat Israel had already begun in the 1930s. Yet, again it would be difficult to imagine that none of the changes Aguda experienced are attributable to the Nazi threat. That is certainly the only conclusion that can be derived from recently published letters relating to an abortive effort in 1938 and 1939 to form a United Religious Front between Aguda and the religious Zionist Mizrachi party.⁴¹

As noted, the Holocaust was not the only catalyst for communal transformation between 1945 and 1948. Particularly in Amer-

ica, generational shifts and a search for meaningful lives as Jews and Americans — during a period of steeply declining religious observance — also drove many American Jews into the Zionist camp. But it must also be noted that the Holocaust and the sense of guilt (correct or otherwise) felt in many circles within the community over the failure to rescue European Jewry furthered this trend and considerably speeded it up.

When the Biltmore Resolution's "Commonwealth Plank" was retained by the American Jewish Conference of 1943, over the objections of the American Jewish Committee, the latter organization withdrew from the Conference: the Committee refused to compromise its non-Zionist position even in the name of Jewish unity. In late 1947 or early 1948, however, the Committee's position changed radically. Judge Proskauer, who had articulated a position against Jewish statehood as recently as 1946, declared in a conversation with Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson that — having recently visited with DPs in Europe — he now considered himself a Zionist and wholeheartedly supported action on behalf of a Jewish state. Proskauer pointed out that conditions in the world had changed radically and, as a result, he had changed his position.⁴² The same may be said for much of the previously undecided and non-Zionist (and even some anti-Zionist) segments of almost every Jewish community in the world.⁴³

Conclusion

The Holocaust and the rise of the State of Israel have been correctly seen as the two defining events that shaped contemporary Jewish history.⁴⁴ Furthermore, the evidence presented here leads to only one plausible conclusion: that the Holocaust acted as a catalyst which considerably speeded up the attainment of Zionist goals. While it may be an exaggeration to claim that the Holocaust caused the State of Israel to come into existence, the fact that the two events were linked by more than just chronological proximity has already been established.

In the two cases of aliya and transforming Zionist goals, it is clear that the metamorphosis occurred during the 1930s. Partly, the transformation was caused by internal dynamics, specifically the intense fear of impending and total failure that pervaded the Zionist movement after the Passfield White Paper was published in 1930. However, comparatively speaking, another major cause for this transformation was Zionist desperation to act quickly be-

fore the long-feared nightmare that had come true had irrevocably destroyed what Zionism set out to save. The Nazi rise to power and the increasing persecution of German and, after 1939, European Jewry played precisely that transformative role. That the Holocaust served in this preeminent role may be judged by the repeated references to time, and especially to the limited time left to accomplish Zionist goals before the catastrophe broke, in statements made by Jabotinsky, Weizmann, Ben-Gurion, and other Zionist leaders.

Even more clear is the metamorphosis of the Zionist organization from one, competing element within most Jewish communities to the defining element within those communities. This metamorphosis took place mainly after the Holocaust, but was seen by participants exclusively in terms of their response to the horrifying events that took place in the mass graveyard created by the Nazi Moloch during World War II.

From the historical perspective, it is clear that the Holocaust and the State of Israel share more than a mere chronological coincidence; they share a cause and effect relationship that is defined here as the relationship between a catalyst and a result. The Holocaust was not the only cause for the State of Israel's emergence; it was, nonetheless, the catalyst that forced a change in timetable from decades to merely twenty years.

The Holocaust represented one aspect of the Jewish condition in the modern world, that of powerlessness; Zionism represented the means to escape from that condition; and the State of Israel represented (and still represents) the Jewish emergence from powerlessness.

Notes

- * This essay is dedicated to the memory of my father, teacher, co-author, and best friend, Hershel Edelheit (1926-1995), and to my wife and muse, Carol Ann Stein Edelheit.
- 1. Hershel Edelheit, "Journal from a Lost World," notes for an unpublished memoir in author's possession.
- 2. Cf. David Arnow, "The Holocaust and the Birth of Israel: Reassessing the Causal Relationship," *Journal of Israeli History*, vol. 15, no. 1 (Autumn 1994):257.
- 3. For one example, see D.F. Fleming, *The Cold War and its Origins, 1917-1960* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1961), vol. 1.

4. For a recent review of the multiple causes of the American Civil War, see James A. Rawley, *Abraham Lincoln and a Nation Worth Fighting For* (Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson, 1996), *passim*.
5. Thus, for example, Arnow listed the Yishuv's population in 1939 as 445,000 — a fivefold increase over the 1920 figure of 84,000 — without mentioning the impact of Nazism and Nazi-inspired anti-Semitism outside of Germany on this increase, especially during the Fifth Aliya, "The Holocaust," p. 260.
6. Cf. Hershel Edelheit and Abraham J. Edelheit, comps., *The World in Turmoil: An Integrated Chronology of the Holocaust and World War II* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1991).
7. Hershel Edelheit and Abraham J. Edelheit, *History of Zionism: A Handbook and Dictionary* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000), ch. 3.
8. *Ibid.*, ch 2.
9. Ironically, Borochoy's words were cited as a proof-text by Jabotinsky, whose own Zionist orientation could not have been more different than Borochoy's. Although I have never found this exact quote in any of Borochoy's writings, numerous similar allusions exist in his collected works. Cf. Matityahu Mintz, "Ber Borochoy," *Studies in Zionism*, no. 5 (April 1982):33-53; and Abraham J. Edelheit, *The Yishuv in the Shadow of the Holocaust: Zionist Politics and Rescue Aliya, 1933-1939* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), p. 69.
10. For a slightly different approach, see Anita Shapira, "Did the Zionist Leadership Foresee the Holocaust?" in Jehuda Reinharz, ed., *Living with Antisemitism: Modern Jewish Responses* (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1987), pp. 397-412.
11. *American Jewish Yearbook* (hereafter: *AJYB*), vol. 30, (1933/34): 297-298.
12. *Davar*, January 8, 1930, p. 2.
13. David Gurevich, comp., *Statistical Handbook of Jewish Palestine* (Jerusalem: Jewish Agency for Palestine, 1947), pp. 98-108.
14. Edelheit, *Shadow of the Holocaust*, pp. 57-62, 160-162, 164-171, 176-181.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 59.
16. Edwin Black, *The Transfer Agreement* (New York: Macmillan, 1984), *passim*.
17. On mass aliya schemes during the 1930s, see Edelheit, *Shadow of the Holocaust*, pp. 68-70. On Ben-Gurion, see Dvora Hachohen, "Ben-Gurion and the Second World War: Plans for Mass Immigration to Palestine," *Studies in Contemporary Jewry*, vol. 7 (1991): 247-268.
18. Chaim Weizmann, circular letter, May 31, 1934, Central Zionist Archive (hereafter: CZA), S25/9809.
19. David H. Shapira, *La-Alot be-Hol ha-Drahim: Toldot ha-Ha'apala la-Eretz Israel me-Reshit ha-Shilton ha-Briti ve-Ad Shilhei Shnot ha-Shloshim (1918-1937)* [Aliya By Any Means: A History of Jew-

- ish "Illegal" Immigration to Eretz Israel From the Beginning of British Rule to the End of the Thirties, 1918-1937] (Tel Aviv: Am Oved and Tel Aviv University Center for the Study of Aliya Bet, 1994), and *Ha'apala: Measef le-Toldot ha-Hazala, ha-Briha, ha-Ha'apala, ve-Sheerit ha-Pleta* [Haapala: Studies in the History of Illegal Immigration to Palestine, 1934-1948] (Tel Aviv: Am Oved and Tel Aviv University Center for the Study of Aliya Bet, 1990).
20. Dalia Ofer, *Escaping the Holocaust: Illegal Immigration to the Land of Israel, 1939-1944* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 311-318.
21. Edelheit, *Shadow of the Holocaust*, pp. 208-213, 227-228, 241-242.
22. Arnow, "The Holocaust," pp. 266-271.
23. United Zionist Organization Circular #4, September 3, 1945, CZA S25/1983, p. 3.
24. Yehuda Bauer, *Flight and Rescue: Brichah* (New York: Random House, 1970), ch. 1-2, 6-7.
25. Cf. Norman A. Rose, *The Gentile Zionists: A Study in Anglo-Zionist Diplomacy, 1929-1939* (London: Frank Cass, 1973).
26. The incident was cited in Joseph B. Schechtman, *The Life and Times of Vladimir Jabotinsky* (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1961), vol. 2, pp. 152-154.
27. Edelheit, *Shadow of the Holocaust*, pp. 135-151.
28. *Ibid.*, pp. 61-62.
29. Minutes of a Meeting with the High Commissioner, July 9, 1936, CZA S25/19.
30. *Protokolim Shel ha-Kongress ha-Zioni ha-Olami ha-Esrim* [Protocols of the Twentieth Zionist Congress] (Jerusalem: World Zionist Organization, 1937), pp. 1-6.
31. *Three Congress Addresses: XXth Zionist Congress, Zurich* (New York: Zionist Organization of America, 1937), p. 1.
32. David H. Shpiro, *From Philanthropy to Activism: The Political Transformation of American Zionism in the Holocaust Years, 1933-1945* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1994), *passim*.
33. The Biltmore Resolution, 1942, cited in Walter Laqueur, ed., *The Israel-Arab Reader*, 2nd. ed. (New York: Bantam Books, 1971), p. 79.
34. Abba Hillel Silver, "Toward American Jewish Unity," in *Vision and Victory* (New York: Zionist Organization of America, 1949), pp. 18-19.
35. Edelheit and Edelheit, *History of Zionism*, ch. 9-10, provides a broad overview of the events described here. The ideological impact of the Holocaust, in relation to aliya policy, was reviewed in Dalia Ofer, "The Dilemma of Rescue and Redemption: Mass Immigration to Israel in the First Years of Statehood," *YIVO Annual*, vol. 20 (1991):185-210.
36. Arnow, "The Holocaust," p. 265.
37. Shpiro, *From Philanthropy to Activism*, pp. 71-74.

38. Edelheit and Edelheit, *History of Zionism*, ch. 6. I hope to return to this subject in more detail at a later date.
39. Cf. Ezra Mendelsohn, *On Modern Jewish Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), ch. 1-6.
40. *Ibid.*, ch. 7 should be read with the diverse ideological statements collected in Feliks Gross and Basil J. Vlavianos, eds., *Struggle for Tomorrow: Modern Political Ideologies of the Jewish People* (New York: Arts Incorporated, 1954).
41. Monty N. Penkower, "A Lost Opportunity: Pre-World War II Efforts Toward Mizrachi-Agudas Israel Cooperation," *Journal of Israeli History*, vol. 17, no. 2 (Summer, 1996):221-261.
42. Nahum Goldmann, "The Influence of the Holocaust on the Change in the Attitude of World Jewry to Zionism and the State of Israel," *Holocaust and Rebirth: A Symposium* (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1973), pp. 97-98. Cf. Menahem Kaufman, *An Ambiguous Partnership: Non-Zionists and Zionists in America, 1939-1948* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1991).
43. Shmuel Ettinger, "The Holocaust as a Factor in the National Awakening of Soviet Jewry," in *Holocaust and Rebirth*, pp. 159-190; Yehuda Bauer, *The Jewish Emergence from Powerlessness* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), pp. 52-78; and Gideon Shimoni, "Selig Brodetsky and the Ascendancy of Zionism in Anglo-Jewry," *Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 22, no. 2 (December 1980):125-161.
44. Daniel J. Elazar and Stuart A. Cohen, *The Jewish Polity* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), p. 208.