In October 1882, Validimir Dubnow, one of the earliest Zionist pioneers in Palestine, wrote to his brother articulating the ultimate goals of the Zionists movement:
"The ultimate goal . . . is, in time, to take over the Land of Israel and to restore to the Jews the political independence they have been deprived of for these two thousand years. . . . The Jews will yet arise and, arms in hand (if need be), declare that they are the masters of their ancient homeland." (Righteous Victims, p. 49)
In October 1882 Ben-Yehuda and Yehiel Michal Pines, few of the earliest Zionist pioneers in Palestine, wrote describing the indigenous Palestinians:
". . . There are now only five hundred [thousand] Arabs, who are not very strong, and from whom we shall easily take away the country if only we do it through stratagems [and] without drawing upon us their hostility before we become a the strong and papules ones." (Righteous Victims, p. 49)
In 1914 Yitzhak Ben-Zvi (Israel's second president) advocated the employment of exclusive Jewish Labour in Jewish run business, he wrote:
"It should have been the case that the Jewish bourgeoisie would be chauvinistic and would demand only Jewish labor. We, the socialists, tending toward internationalism, should have demanded that workers be employed without regard to national and religious differences. In reality, we see exactly the opposite." (Righteous Victims, p. 51)
In 1909 Meir Disengoff, who become Tel-Aviv's first mayor, asked:
"How can Jews, who demand emancipation in Russia, rob the rights of, and act selfishly toward, other workers upon coming to Eretz Yisrael." (Righteous Victims, p. 51)
In March 1911, 150 Palestinian notables cabled the Turkish parliament protesting land sales to Zionist Jews. The governor of Jerusalem, Azmi Bey, responded:
"We are not xenophobes; we welcome all strangers. We are not anti-Semites; we value the economic superiority of the Jews. But no nation, no government could open its arms to groups. . . . aiming to take Palestine from us." (Righteous Victims, p. 62)
In 1916 Lord Balfour declared that he is a "Zionists" during a British Cabinet meeting. In an encounter between Weizmann and Balfour:
"[Weizmann] laid out his much repeated argument -- that Zionists and British interests are IDENTICAL. The Zionist movement spoke, Weizmann said, with the vocabulary of modern statesmanship, but was fueled by a deep religious consciousness. Balfour, himself a modern statesman, also CONSIDERED Zionism as an inherent part of his Christian faith. . . . Soon after, Balfour declared in a cabinet meeting, I AM A ZIONIST." (One Palestine Complete, p. 41)
And in the same year, Balfour also state:
"[He and Lloyed George had been influenced] by the desire to give the Jews their rightful place in the world; a great nation without a home is not right." (Righteous Victims, p. 72)
In 1917, the Zionist Organization, which had offices in both the Allied and Central Powers, was neutral, and it was feared that Germany might preempt the Allies with a pro-Zionist declaration of its own. a visit to Paris by the Russian Zionist Nahum Sokolow helped convince French Quai d'Orsay that the time had come for a pro-Zionist statement. In exchange Sokolow agreed to rally Jewish support for continued Russian participation in the war. On June 4, 1917, the director general of the French Foreign Ministry, Jules Cambon, issued the declaration that serve as a precedent and basis for the more significant Balfour Declaration:
"You [Sokolow] . . . consider that, circumstances permitting, and the independence of the Holy Places being safeguarded . . . . it would be a deed of justice and reparation to assist, the protection of Allied Powers, in the renaissance of the Jewish nationality in that land from which the people of Israel were exiled so man centuries ago.
The French Government, which entered this present war to defend a people wrongfully attacked [the Belgians], and which continues to struggle to assure the victory of right over might, cannot but feel sympathy for your cause, the triumph of which is bound up with that of the Allies." (Righteous Victims, p. 74)
Foremost among Jewish critics to Zionism was Sir Edwin Montagu, Secretary of State for India and the only Jewish member of the British Cabinet. His dissent from the political nature of Zionist aims stemmed from conviction that Judaism was a universal faith, distinct from nationality, and that in the era of the modern nation-State the Jewish people did not constitute a nation. He questioned the credentials of the Zionist Organization to speak for all Jews. In secret memoranda (later made public) he wrote:
"Zionism has always seemed to me to be a mischievous political creed, untenable by any patriotic citizen of the United Kingdom ... I have always understood that those who indulged in this creed were largely animated by the restrictions upon and refusal of liberty to Jews in Russia. But at the very time when these Jews have been acknowledged as Jewish Russians and given all liberties, it seems to be inconceivable that Zionism should be officially recognized by the British Government, and that Mr. Balfour should be authorized to say that Palestine was to be reconstituted as the 'national home of the Jewish people'. I do not know what this involves, but I assume that it means that Mohammedans and Christians are to make way for the Jews, and that the Jews should be put in all positions of preference and should be peculiarly associated with Palestine in the same way that England is with the English or France with the French, that Turks and other Mohammedans in Palestine will be regarded as foreigners, just in the same way as Jews will hereafter be treated as foreigners in every country but Palestine ... When the Jews are told that Palestine is their national home, every country will immediately desire to get rid of its Jewish citizens, and you will find a population in Palestine driving out its present inhabitants, taking all the best in the country ...
"I deny that Palestine is today associated with the Jews or properly to be regarded as a fit place for them to live in. The Ten Commandments were delivered to the Jews on Sinai. It is quite true that Palestine plays a large part in Jewish history, but so it does in modern Mohammedan history, and, after the time of the Jews, surely it plays a larger part than any other country in Christian history ...
"... When the Jew has a national home, surely it follows that the impetus to deprive us of the rights of British citizenship must be enormously increased. Palestine will become the world's ghetto. Why should the Russian give the Jew equal rights? His national home is Palestine". (UN: The Origins And Evolution Of Palestine Problem, section II)
When the question of the British Mandate over Palestine was discussed in British Parliament in the late 1910s, it became clear that opinion in the House of Lords was strongly opposed to the Balfour Declaration, as illustrated by the words of Lord Sydenham in reply to Lord Balfour:
"... the harm done by dumping down an alien population upon an Arab country - Arab all around in the hinterland - may never be remedied ... what we have done is, by concessions, not to the Jewish people but to a Zionist extreme section, to start a running sore in the East, and no one can tell how far that sore will extend." (UN: The Origins And Evolution Of Palestine Problem, section IV)
While the Zionist leadership was discussing the morality of "transferring" the Palestinian people in December 1918, Yitzhak Avigdor Wilkansky, an agronomist and advisor at the Palestine Office in JAFFA, felt that, for practical reasons, it was:
"impossible to evict the fellahin [Palestinian Arab peasants], even if we wanted to. Nevertheless, if it were possible, I would commit an INJUSTICE towards the [Palestinian] Arabs. There are those among us who are opposed to this form the point of view of supreme righteousness and morality. . . .[But] when you enter into the midst of the Arab nation and do not allow it to unit, here too you are taking its life. . . . Why don't our moralists dwell on this point? We must be either complete vegetarians or meat eaters: not one-half, one-third, or one-quarter vegetarian." (Righteous Victims, p. 140-141 & America And The Founding Of Israel, p. 71)
Edward Mandell House, US President Wilson's aid, wrote Lord Balfour predicting the outcome of future implementation of the Balfour Declaration:
"It is all bad and I told Balfour so. They are making [the Middle East] a breeding place for future war." (Righteous Victims, p. 73)
While the peace conference was convening at Versailles in the early 1919, a debate has erupted whether to grant the Mandate over Palestine to the Americans or to the British. Zionists opposed the U.S. control to the country on the grounds that American democracy (where majority rule) ran COUNTER to the plan for "national home" in Palestine. A publication issued by the Zionist Organization in London wrote:
"Democracy in American too commonly means MAJORITY RULE without regard to diversities of types or stages of civilization or differences of quality. Democracy in that sense has been called the melting pot in which that quantitatively lesser is assimilated into quantitatively greater. This doubtless is natural in America, and works on the whole very well. But if American idea were applied as an American administration might apply it to Palestine, what would happen? The numerical majority in Palestine today is [Palestinian] Arab, not Jewish. Qualitatively, it is a simple fact that the Jews are now predominant in Palestine, and given proper conditions they will be predominant quantitatively also in a generation or two. But if the crude arithmetical conception of democracy were to be applied now, or at some early stage in the future to Palestinian conditions, the majority that would rule would be the Arab majority, and the task of establishing and developing a great Jewish Palestine would be infinitely more difficult." The problem at the HEART of the Zionist claim was RARELY ARTICULATED so clearly: the Zionist dream ran COUNTER to the principle of democracy. (One Palestine Complete, p. 119)
In November 2, 1918, Balfour day parade in Jewish Jerusalem, Musa Kathim al-Husseini, Jerusalem's mayor at the time, handed the British governor of Palestine, Storrs, a petition from more than 100 Palestinian notables which stated:
"We have noticed yesterday a large crowed of Jews carrying banners and over-running the streets shouting words which hurt the feeling and wound the soul. They [Zionist Jews] pretend with OPEN VOICE that Palestine, which is the Holy Land of our fathers and the graveyard of our ancestors, which has been inhabited by the Arabs for long ages, who loved it and died in defending it, is NOW a national home for them." (Righteous Victims, p. 90)
In 1919 Lord Balfour, the father of the Bolfour Declaration, justified the usurpation of Palestinians right of self determination as the following:
"Zionism, be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-old traditions, in present needs, in future hopes, of far profounder important then the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit the ancient land." (Righteous Victims, p. 75)
As early as October 25, 1919 Winston Churchill predicted that Zionism implied the clearing of the indigenous population, he wrote:
"there are the Jews, whom we are PLEDGED to introduce into Palestine, and who take it for GRANTED the the local [Palestinian] population will be CLEARED out to suit their convenience." (Expulsion Of The Palestinians, p. 15)
In March 1921 Winston Churchill, a life long Zionist, ASSURED Arabs that Jews WOULD NOT dispossess them one day:
"It is manifestly right that the scattered Jews should have a national center and a national home and be reunited and where else but in Palestine with which for 3,000 years they have been intimately and profoundly associated? We think it will be good for the world, good for the British Empire, but also good for the Arabs who dwell in Palestine. . . . They shall share in the benefits and progress of Zionism." (Righteous Victims, p. 99)
And also in 1921 Churchill assured the Palestinian delegation headed by Kathim al-Huseini the Palestinian rights will be preserved:
"[The Jews would not] take any man's lands. They CANNOT dispossess any man of his RIGHTS or his PROPERTY. . . . There is room for all." (Righteous Victims, p. 100)
And in October 1941, Churchill wrote in a secret Cabinet minute in support of partition Palestine into two state (in defiance of the 1939 White Paper):
"I may say at once that if Britain and the United States emerged victorious from the war, the creation of a GREAT JEWISH STATE in Palestine inhabited by MILLIONS OF JEWS will be one of the LEADING FEATURES of the peace conference discussions." (Righteous Victims, p. 167-168)
In 1936 the Mapai leader David Hacohen explained how Zionist socialism should be for Jews not Arabs, he said:
"I remember being one of the first of our comrades [of the Ahdut Ha'avodah] to got to London after the first World War. ... There I became a socialist. ... [In Palestine] I had to fight my friends on the issue of Jewish socialism, to defend the fact that I would not accept Arabs in my trade union, the Histadrut; to defend preaching to the housewives that they not buy at [Palestinian] Arab stores, to prevent [Palestinian] Arab workers from getting jobs there. .... To pour kerosene on the [Palestinian] Arab tomatoes; to attack Jewish housewives in the markets and smash the Arab eggs they had bought; to praise to the skies the Keneen Kayemet [Jewish National Fund] that sent Hankin to Beirut to buy land from absentee effendi [landlords] and to throw the fellahin [peasants] off the land-- to buy dozens of dunums-- from an Arab is permitted, but to sell, God forbid, one Jewish dunam to an Arab is prohibited." (Expulsion Of The Palestinians, p. 25) Such racist sentiment was the norm among the early Zionist leaders, similar statements were also repeated by Ben Gurion and Jabotinsky.
In 1938 Berl Katzneslon, the influential Mapai leader, stated his opinion of the demographic make up of the Jewish states upon the implementation of the partition proposed by the Peel Commission:
"There is the question of how the army, the police, and the civil service will function and how a state can be run if part of its population is disloyal .....[and the Palestinian Arabs will get equal rights as Jews] ... ONLY a small minority of [the Palestinian] Arabs will remain in the country." (Expulsion Of The Palestinians, p. 115)
On June 9 1942 Lord Moyne (who was later to be assassinated on November 6th 1944 by the Stern gang in Cairo) told the House of Lords in London:
"[the European Jews were] not only ALIEN in culture but also in blood. Immigration on this scale [3 million dispossessed European Jews] would be DISASTROUS MISTAKE and indeed an impractical dream. The [Palestinian] Arabs who have lived and buried their dead for fifty generations in Palestine, WILL NOT WILLINGLY surrender their land and self-government to the Jews." (Israel: A History, p. 113)
In April 1943 Churchill said in defiance to the British 1939 White Paper:
"I CANNOT agree that the White Paper is the firmly established policy of the present Government. I have always regarded it as a gross breach of faith committed by the Chamberlain Government in respect of obligations to which I personally was a party." (Righteous Victims, p. 166)
On 12 January 1944 Churchill wrote to his senior War Cabinet colleagues in defiance of the British 1939 White Paper:
"Some form of partition is the ONLY solution." and thirteen days later he informed the Chief of Staff Committee: "OBVIOUSLY we shall not proceed with ANY FORM of partition which Jews to do not support." (Israel: A History, p. 116)
In March 1944 the United States president, Franklin D. Roosevelt (who described himself as a Zionist to Josef Stalin in 1945), assured Jews of the FULL American support to establishment of a "Jewish National Home", he said:
"FULL JUSTICE will be done [after the war] to those who seek a JEWISH NATIONAL HOME, for which our Government and the American People have always had the deepest sympathy and today more than ever in view of the tragic plight of hundreds of thousands of homeless Jewish refugees." (Righteous Victims, p. 171)
On 4 November 1944, Churchill told Chaim Weizmann in defiance to the 1939 White Paper:
"[If the Jews could] get the WHOLE of Palestine, it would be a good thing, but if it came to choice between the  White Paper and partition, then they should take partition." Churchill also told Weizmann that "he too was for the inclusion of the Negev" in the future Jewish State. (Israel: A History, p. 118)
On March 22, 1945 the Arab states, soon after a meeting for the Arab League, issued the "Alexandria Protocol" which stated:
"The rights of the Arabs [of Palestine] CANNOT BE TOUCHED with prejudice to peace and stability in the Arab world. . . [The Arab state were] second to none in REGRETTING the woes which have been inflicted on the Jews of Europe. . . . But the Question of these Jews should not be CONFUSED with ZIONISM, for there can be NO GREATER INJUSTICE and AGGRESSION than solving the problem of Europe Jews by . . . inflicting INJUSTICE on the Palestine Arabs." (Righteous Victims, p. 172)
In March 1948 Ezra Danin, a senior member of the Political Department's Arab Division in the Haganah, described the pattern of the Haganah treatment of the Palestinians, he said:
"As a result of several superfluous [Haganah] operations, which mainly hurt 'good' Arabs who were in contact with us .... the [Palestinian Arab] mass exodus from all places were continuing. The Arabs have simply lost their faith [in our goodwill]?" (Benny Morris p. 41)
Ya'acov Shimoni, a senior member of the Political Department's Arab Division in the Haganah, quoted a Haganah commander in March 1948:
"war is war there was no possibility of distinguishing between good or bad Arabs." (Benny Morris, p. 41)
"every man of strength and wisdom, every young person of power and faith [from Palestine], who has left the country, let him return to the dear spot. No one should remain outside the country except the rich and the old." The king Abdullah went on to thank: "those of you . . . who have remained where they are in spite of tyranny now prevailing," and went out of his way to cite the Jewish Agency condemnation of the massacre perpetrated at Deir Yassin on April 9, 1948. (Benny Morris, p. 134)
On May 10, 1948, Aharon Cohen, the director during the war of the Arab Department of the newly formed MAPAM party, wrote in a memorandum to the party's Political Committee:
"There is a reason to believe that what is being done . . . is being done out of certain political objectives and not only out of military necessities, as they claim sometimes. In fact, the TRANSFER of the [Palestinian] Arabs from the boundaries of the Jewish state is being implemented . . . the EVACUATION/CLEARING out of [Palestinian] Arab villages is not always done out of military necessity. The complete destruction of the villages is not always done only because there are no sufficient forces to maintain a garrison." (Expulsion Of The Palestinians, p. 181)
Soon after the occupation of Haifa, most local Jewish civilian leadership (such the mayor Shabtai Levy) had not been averse to an Palestinian return, a major change of thinking had taken place in the course of May 1948. By June 6, 1948 the drift of a meeting in the Haifa town hall was, in the word of one participant:
"There are no sentiment in war . . .Better to cause them injustice than that [we suffer] a disaster . . . We have no interest in their returning." (Benny Morris, p. 134)
The U.N. Mediator Count Bernadotte reported on September 16 1948 (one day before his assassination in Jerusalem by the Stern terror gang which was lead at the time by Israel's future Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir) that Palestinians refugees must return to their homes, farms and business:
"at the earliest possible date. [NO] just and complete" settlement was possible, the Mediator wrote, if the right of return was not recognized. "It would be an OFFENCE against the principles of elemental justice if these innocent victims of the conflict were denied the right of return to their homes while Jewish immigrants flow into Palestine and, indeed, at least offer threat of permanent replacement of the [Palestinian] Arab refugees," he wrote. At the same time, however, Bernadotte was fully aware the the radically changed and changing circumstances in Israel (including the immigrant influx) strongly militated against future mass return of refugees. "It must not be supposed," he wrote, "that the establishment of the right of refugees to return . . . provides solution of the problem. The vast majority of the refugees may no long have homes to return to and their re-establishment in the State of Israel presents an economic and social problem of special complexity." (Benny Morris, p. 151)
On July 24 1948 the Mapai Center held a full-scale debate regarding the Palestinian Arab question against the background of the ethnic cleansing of Ramla and Lydda. The majority apparently backed Ben-Gurion's policies of population transfer or ethnic cleansing. Shlomo Lavi, one of the influential leaders of the Mapai party, said that:
"the ... transfer of the [Palestinian] Arabs out of the country in my eyes is one of the MOST JUST, MORAL and CORRECT that can be done. I have thought of this for many years." (Expulsion Of The Palestinians, p. 192)
This was seconded by Avraham Katznelson, another influential Mapai leader, who also said:
"more moral, from the viewpoint of universal human ethics, than the emptying of the Jewish state of the [Palestinian] Arabs and their transfer elsewhere .... This requires [the use of] force." (Expulsion Of The Palestinians, p. 192)
An officer of the police national headquarters, who had visited the villages of Elabun and Mrar (in the Galilee) in November 1948, reported:
"All the inhabitants of Elabun were DEPORTED, except for four villagers who are Greek Orthodox, and a small number of old people and children. The total number of inhabitants left in the village is 52. The priests complained bitterly about the EXPULSION of the villagers and demanded their return. . . . In Mrar, most of the inhabitants remained, except for many of the Muslims." (1949, The First Israelis, p. 28)
The following is a discussion between MAPAI secretariat regarding demographic make up of the "Jewish state" soon after the 1948 war:
Shlomo Levi, MK: " . . . The LARGE NUMBER of [Palestinian] Arabs in the country worries me. The time come when we will be the minority in the State of Israel. There are now 170,000 [Palestinian] Arabs in the country, including 22,000 school-age children. The natural increase among [Palestinians] Arabs is high and keeps growing, especially if we give them all the economic advantages which we are intending to give: health, education and big benefits. There is no such rate of natural increase anywhere in the world, and we have to give careful thought to this imminent danger. Such an increase could match our immigration. . . . We may reach the point when the interests of [Palestinian] Arabs rather than of the Jews will determine the character of the country. . . ."
Eliyahu Camreli, MK: "I'm NOT WILLING to accept a single [Palestinian] Arab, and not only an Arab but any gentile. I want the State of Israel to be ENTIRELY JEWISH, the descendents of Abraham, Issac, and Jacob. . . ."
Yehiel Duvdenvany, MK: "If there was any way of solving the problem way of transfer [the Israeli propaganda term for ethnic cleansing] of the remaining 170,000 [Palestinian] Arabs we would do so. . . ."
David Hakohen, MK: "We didn't plan the departure of the [Palestinian] Arabs. It was a miracle. . . ."
Z. Onn: "The landscape is MORE BEAUTIFUL----I enjoy it, especially, when traveling between Haifa and Tel Aviv, and there is not a single [Palestinian] Arab to be seen." (1949, The First Israelis, p. 46-47)
Soon after the 1948 war, the "Jewish state" imposed a martial law against the remaining Palestinian citizens of the state. The political aim of the martial law was summed up in the following TOP SECRET memorandum:
"The government's policy . . . has SOUGHT TO DIVIDE the [Palestinian] Arab population status of the [Palestinian] Arab villages, and competitive spirit of local elections, deepened the divisions inside the villages themselves. The communal policy and the clan divisions in the villages prevented [Palestinian] Arab unity. . . . Martial law has ruled all this time with complete and total authority."" (1949, The First Israelis, p. 65)
In 1949 a cable was sent by the US ambassador in Damascus to Washington about Israel's rejections of the proposal sent by Husni al-Za'im (Syria's president in 1949) to conclude a comprehensive peace agreement with Israel:
"Unless Israel can be BROUGHT to understand that it CANNOT have all of its cake (partition boundaries) and gravy as well (area captured in violation of truce, Jerusalem and resettlement of [Palestinian] Arab refugees elsewhere) it may find that it has WON Pal[stine] war but LOST peace. It should be evident that Israel's continued insistence upon her pound of flesh and more is DRIVING Arab states (and perhaps surely) to gird their lions (politically and economically if not yet militarily) for LONG range struggle." (Righteous Victims, p. 264)
On May 5, 1948 Golda Myrson [later changed to Meir] visited Palestinian Arab Haifa after it was conquered by the Israelis, and on May 6, 1948 she reported to the Jewish Agency Executive:
"It is dreadful thing to see the dead city. I found next to the port [Palestinian Arab] children, women, the old, waiting for a way to leave. I entered the houses, there were houses where coffee and pitot were left on the table, I COULD NOT AVOID [thinking] that this, INDEED, had been the picture in many Jewish towns [i.e. in Europe, during the World War II].
Three weeks before H.M. King Abdullah was killed in 1951, the H.M. said:
"I could justify a peace by pointing to concessions made by the Jews. But without any concessions from them, I am a DEFEATED before I even start." (Righteous Victims, p. 263)
Pinhas Lavon boasted in front of the General Staff that no fewer than forty small military operation had been initiated since he became Minister of Defense in the early 1950s, he said:
"acts of robbery, laying mines, destroying houses, firing on vehicles, etc. . . . During these years MORE WAS DONE in the military share than in all the years of the struggle." (Iron Wall, p. 108) The use of terror and other forms of collective punishments against civilian population was normal in the Israeli Army, Moshe Dayan made similar confessions, click here for details.
In an interview with the the Sunday Times Golda Meir, Israel's Prime Minister between 1969-1974, stated in June 1969:
"It is not as though there was a Palestinian people in Palestine considering itself as Palestinian people and we came and threw them out and took their country away from them, they DID NOT EXIST." (Iron Wall, p. 311)
Israel's leaders drew the wrong lessons from the War of Attrition with Egypt in 1969. They continued to cling to the defensive military doctrine and its corollary, a static defense system, even though the war had shown it to be costly and ineffective. In the that regards, Mordachai Gur, who became chief of staff in 1974, wrote in the IDF monthly (July-1987 edition):
"There is not doubt that our victory in the War of Attrition was very important, but did only one conclusion follow from it---to sit and do nothing? That we are strong and if the Arabs want peace, they have to come to us on their knees and accept out terms? . . . This was the great political and strategic mistake--- the reliance on force as the almost exclusive factor in the formulation of policy." (Iron Wall, p. 297) It is often argued in Israel that Arabs listens ONLY to the language of force, click here to read our response.
Similarly, Abba Eban, a veteran Israeli Foreign Ministry official, PREDICTED that Arabs will resort to force in response to Israel's intransigence on the political path between 1971-1973. He also predicted that Arabs will go to WAR even if they KNEW they might LOOSE, he wrote:
"All the time, the Israeli defense strategy was frankly attritional. The logic was that if the Arabs were unable to get their territories back by war or by Great Power pressure, they would have to seek negotiations and to satisfy some of Israel's security interest. This view made no provision for the third Arab option---neither docility nor negotiation, but a desperate recourse to war in the hope that even an unsuccessful attack would be more rewarding than passive acceptance of the cease fire lines." (Iron Wall, p. 309)
The following conversation occurred between Yitzhak Rabin and King Hussein over the years between 1976-1995:
Rabin: "You are very stubborn."
King Hussein: "Yes, I was because I could not give an inch of Palestinian territory or an iota of Palestinian rights."
Rabin: "Well, there is nothing that can be done. Wait for ten years; maybe things will change on the ground."
King Hussein: "Well, too bad." (Iron Wall, p. 334)
When it was time for Palestinians to leave the besieged Beirut in August 1982, and they had no where to go, Ariel Sharon asked an Egyptian intermediary to persuade Arafat to lead the PLO back to Jordan and said if Arafat accepted, Israel would force King Hussein to make way for the organization, Sharon boasted said:
"One speech by me will make King Hussein realize that the time has come to pack his bags."
Arafat immediately replied:
"1-Jordan is not the home of the Palestinians 2-You are trying to exploit the agony of the Palestinian people by turning a Palestinian-Lebanese dispute into a Palestinian-Jordanian contradiction." When Sharon heard Arafat's reply, he responded with an obscene curse in Arabic. (Iron Wall, p. 412)