Prev | Next | ![]() |
Prev | Next |
PalestineRemembered | About Us | Oral History | العربية | |
![]() |
Pictures | Zionist FAQs | Haavara | Maps |
Search |
Camps |
Districts |
Acre |
Baysan |
Beersheba |
Bethlehem |
Gaza |
Haifa |
Hebron |
Jaffa |
Jericho |
Jerusalem |
Jinin |
Nablus |
Nazareth |
Ramallah |
al-Ramla |
Safad |
Tiberias |
Tulkarm |
Donate |
Contact |
Profile |
Videos |
British Mandate: A Survey of Palestine: Volume II - Page 598 |
Disclaimer
The above documents, article, interviews, movies, podcasts, or stories reflects solely the research and opinions of its authors. PalestineRemembered.com makes its best effort to validate its contents.
Post Your Comment
*It should be NOTED that your email address won't be shared, and all communications between members will be routed via the website's mail server.
and the marauding instincts of the Bedu. An account of the steps taken to change the conditions of public security in Palestine which had persisted for so long has been given above.
33. During the early years of the civil administration, the task of pacification was not impeded by organized resistence to the authority of Government. The early riots were largely the work of hysterical crowds, frenzied by irresponsible agitators playing on racial prejudice and religious intolerance. During this period bandit gangs were presenting a less and less serious problem and appear to have limited their operations to predatory operations, including murder. A sinister omen for the future were the activities in the north of Palestine of the Syrian exile, Sheikh Izzadin el Qassem. From 1Q29 until his death in a clash with the police in 1Q35 he preached a blend of religious fanaticism and opposition to the Jews and to Government for facilitating the establishment of a Jewish national home. His teachings brought into being a loosely knit illegal organization, known as the Qassemites, whose members afterwards took a prominent part in the 1936 disturbances. The Qassemite organization bad the character of an armed secret society. The ruthless fanaticism and hysterical nationalism of its members in the use of terrorism as a political weapon were later paralleled by the Irqun Zvai Leumi and Stern Group, although its lack of technical resources and inferior organization fortunately limited the scope of its activities. Events unconnected with these developments, but which again were to find their parallel later, were the riots of 1933; these were attributable indirectly, if not directly, to the actions of the Arab Executive in fomenting demonstrations, which they were incapable of controlling, against the Government's immigration policy. In the period immediately preceding 193G, Arab boy scout troops and youth movements generally became, and were sometimes deliberately used as, the forcing-houses of a bellicose nationalism and tended general!)' to afford a rudimentary training in warlike activities.
34. With the disturbances of 1936 the character of Arab lawlessness charged; its impulses were directed into one general political channel. The movement was under some form of control by self constituted central authorities, initially the Arab Higher Committee and later Haj Amin El Husseini (the Mufti) and his entourage. An early manifestation of this change was the assumption of the title of Generalissimo of the "forces" opposing Government by Fawzi el Kauwakji , a notorious Syrian bravo, who proceeded to issue various "communique" and "proclamations" in this capacity. While this preliminary phase of rebellion ended with Fawzi's abrupt departure for Iraq in the autumn of 1936, the
598